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ABSTRACT 
The goal of this capstone is the strategic redesign of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs (CA) 
Regiment in 2025 in support of the Army 2025 strategic vision. Design Thinking is the 
process used to plan and develop this strategic design. The authors led a twenty-person 
Civil Affairs design team through the five-phase process of Design Thinking adapted 
from the Stanford D School model: discovery; problem framing; ideation; prototyping; 
and testing. Design Thinking’s collaborative and multidisciplinary approach to planning 
yielded innovative prototypes of CA identity, strategic messaging, branding, human 
resource management (e.g., recruitment, selection, training, and professionalization) and 
force structure. Two of these prototypes are in the initial stages of implementation within 
the CA Regiment, while the others await higher resolution development. The capstone 
concludes with recommendations as to how the Regiment can build on this creative and 
innovative endeavor to ensure its strategic relevance in the future. 
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The future will require an increasing number of operations within and 
among populations and an enhanced ability to consolidate and integrate 
contributions from government, military, and coalition partners. 
—General Raymond T. Odierno 
 
A. ARMY 2025 VISION 
The global security environment will continue to be increasingly complex and 
unstable, shaped by emergent trends of urbanization, hybrid threats, the rise of non-state 
actors, and new state challenges to the international order (2010 NSS, pp. 8–9; 2014 
QDR, pp. 3–8; 2015 NSS, pp. 7–10; Odierno & McHugh, 2015, pp. 4–6; Odierno, Amos 
& McRaven, 2013; Department of the Army, 2014b, pp. 10–14). To meet these changes 
and challenges, General Raymond T. Odierno, Army Chief of Staff, and John M. 
McHugh, Secretary of the Army, (2015) envision the Army of 2025 and beyond as the 
world’s premier land force, an agile organization applying sustained expeditionary land 
power while serving as the key integrator of United States (U.S.) and allied efforts in 
defense of the Nation and its interests. As Odierno & McHugh (2015) write in The Army 
Vision: Strategic Advantage in a Complex World (2015), the Army will need to be an 
agile, expert, innovative, interoperable, expeditionary, scalable, versatile, and balanced 
force, one that will  
effectively employ lethal and non-lethal overmatch against any adversary 
to prevent, shape, and win conflicts and achieve national interests. It will 
leverage cross-cultural and regional experts to operate among the 
populations, promote regional security, and be interoperable with the other 
military Services, United States Government agencies and allied and 
partner nations. Leveraging the total force, it will consist of a balanced, 
versatile mix of scalable, expeditionary forces that can rapidly deploy to 
any place on the globe… Composed of agile and innovative institutions, 
soldiers, and civilians, the United States Army of 2025 will provide 
strategic advantage for the Nation with trusted professionals who 
strengthen the enduring bonds between the Army and the people it serves. 
(pp. 6–11) 
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To deliver on these expectations, the Army must demonstrate both unity of effort 
and synchronization of all instruments of national power in conjunction with the activities 
of unified action partners (UAPs).1 Civil Affairs (CA) is central to the coordination and 
collaboration with UAPs, host nation (HN) partners, and the local populace. CA’s 
primary role is to develop persistent and enduring relationships that build capacity, 
transparency, and trust among the partners and the populations with whom CA interacts 
in order to support commanders’ unified actions2 and influence long-term military 
outcomes (Odierno & McHugh, 2015, pp. 3–4).  
B. CAPSTONE PURPOSE 
Currently, the U.S. Army, as described by Odierno & McHugh (2015), is “a force 
simultaneously in transition, in action, and in preparation” (p. 2). After a decade and half 
of sustained Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM (OIF) deployments, the Army is experiencing a period of retrenchment, 
resource constraints, and downsizing. Realigning CA is particularly important, not only 
to adapt the Regiment to the dynamic global security environment, but to support the 
Army 2025 vision, and in so doing, demonstrate its own strategic relevance.  
The purpose of this capstone, therefore, is to strategically design the CA 
Regiment to support the Army 2025 strategic vision. A strategic design is an 
organizational roadmap that sets direction and identifies the key design elements that 
must be realigned with the direction in order to respond to the challenges of a dynamic 
environment (Roberts, 2014).  
C. TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO SETTING DIRECTION  
The traditional approach to setting an organization’s future course can be found in 
business. Ansoff (1965) launched the formal strategic planning school popularized in the 
                                                 
1 Army Doctrine Reference Publication No. 3-0 (ADRP 3-0, May 2012) defines UAPs as “those 
military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with 
whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations.” 
2 Unified action requires leaders to “synchronize, coordinate, and when appropriate, integrate military 
operations with the activities of other governmental and nongovernmental organizations to achieve unity of 
effort” (JP 3-0, 2011, p. xi). 
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1970s. Initial conceptualizations defined strategic planning as a prescribed formal process 
of strategy formation, strategy implementation, and strategy evaluation (David, 2007; 
Steiner, 1969). Although some scholars and practitioners at the time viewed strategic 
planning and strategic management as the same process, others considered strategic 
planning a specialized process central to strategy formulation (David, 2007).  
Strategic planning first involved environmental scanning, which Brown and 
Weiner (1985) defined as using cognitive radar to scan the world systematically to 
identify new, unexpected, major and minor information (p. xi). Others later 
recommended that environmental scans include an internal analysis of the organization’s 
mission, vision, strengths, and weakness (Morrison, 1992). Environmental scanning is 
now considered essential to organizational survival (Aguilar, 1967; Auster & Choo, 
1993; Coates, 1986; Collings, 1968; Fahey & Narayanan, 1986; Fahey, King, & 
Narayanan, 1981; Hambrick, 1979; Kefalas & Schoderbek, 1973; Morrison, Renfro, & 
Boucher, 1984; Sutton, 1988). 
Strategic planning has been used extensively by both businesses and the military. 
Examples of business strategic planning, especially in companies facing volatile and 
unpredictable environments, can be found within the oil industry. Grant (2003) describes 
the detailed planning systems of the world’s largest oil companies, Royal Dutch/Shell, 
Exxon, Mobil, British Petroleum, Elf Aquitaine, Texaco, ENI, and Amoco. His 
assessment of their multi-national, multi-business strategic planning processes concludes 
that their “planning systems fostered adaption and responsiveness, but showed limited 
innovation and analytical sophistication” (p. 491). 
An example of military strategic planning is illustrated by the U.S. Naval Security 
Group (NSG). Frentzel, Bryson, and Crosby (2000) describe the NSG Command’s six-
year strategic planning process. The Command’s aim was to refocus and develop better 
strategies to deal with the new demands for military preparedness in response to dramatic 
shifts of the post-Cold War, Congressional pressures for cross-service cooperation, and 
the emergence of new technologies. The NSG’s incremental process was guided by the 
strategic planning framework of strength, weakness, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) 
traditionally used by public and non-public organizations (p. 402).  
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D. STRATEGIC PLANNING APPROACHES AND THEIR CRITICS 
In Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour through the Wilds of Strategic Management, 
Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel (2005) describe 10 different approaches to planning: 
design, planning, positioning, entrepreneurial, cognitive, learning, power, cultural, 
environmental, and configuration. Of the 10 approaches, the capstone authors chose to 
examine further the Planning School for its business applications, and the Positioning 
School for its military applications. Table 1 provides a summary of both schools and their 
applications (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 2005, pp. 354–359).  








































































The table compares key components of both schools and fields. It highlights the 
basic process by which the central actors formulate their strategies based on their 
organizational characteristics, typical environment and stage (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & 
Lampel, 2005). 
Further analysis reveals both the Planning and the Positioning Schools are linear 
processes and tend to assume charting a course of action as a simple problem in a stable 
environment. Their root response to the environment tends to be reactive rather than a 
proactive. As seen in both the content and process dimensions, the goal of each school is 
to follow routine, prescriptive processes, rather than attempt to search for and take 
advantage of creative opportunities.  
Thus, both schools have their critics. For example, Potts (1984) describes General 
Electric’s successful effort in leading the anti-planning charge in the 1980s. In The Rise 
and Fall of Strategic Planning, Mintzberg (1994) shows evidence through stories, 
empirical research, and studies that planning never works, citing the claim in the Business 
Week cover story published on September, 17, 1984 that the “reign of the strategic 
planner may be at an end” (p. 62). Strategic planners have long list of tools and 
techniques to evaluate the environment; yet, it is difficult for them to identify and select 
the best methods, apply them and measure their results.  
The positioning school also has been criticized, specifically for being too 
narrowly focused and relying heavily on economic factors over political ones. In 
addition, Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel (2005) assert that positioning school 
 6
practitioners prefer to stay home—detached from the environment—and calculate the 
possibilities, e.g., Clausewitz’s claim of “calculation” being “the most essential thing 
to…the end” in gaining superiority (p. 115). This school is focused on generic positions 
in the global context and not on understanding unique contexts and situations. For 
example, the military often will seek to apply generic answers to problems while waiting 
for the proper opening in the environment in which to execute them.  
E. THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES: THE DESIGN APPROACH TO 
DIRECTION SETTING.  
The search is on for new ways to set organizational direction. Both the planning 
and positioning schools have been shown to be inadequate, leading Carlopio (2011) and 
others to insist that addressing environmental and organizational complexity require 
something more than the traditional methods. Camilus (2008) contends ill-defined 
problems or solutions require a non-traditional method. Roberts (1991), referencing the 
Department of Defense (DOD), similarly postulates that due to organizational complexity 
and the need for both coordination and adaptation within the DOD, traditional models of 
decision of making in strategic formulation are inadequate and require a paradigm shift 
from strategic planning to innovative designs (pp. 45–52). Razzouk and Shute (2012) add 
that assisting personnel “to think like designers may better prepare them to deal with 
difficult situations and to solve complex problems” (p. 14).  
1. Design Approach to Planning 
Design theory has attracted innovators across academic disciplines and 
organizations, beginning with Herbert Simon’s (1969) notion of human interaction in the 
design realm. Others have followed suit, introducing new perspectives on design theory 
and practice (Buchanan, 1992; Cross, 2006, 2011; Krippendorff, 2006; Lawson, 2006; 
Schon, 1983). Eventually, design has come to be viewed as an alternative to traditional 
methods of strategic planning. For example, Raimond (1996) championed design as 
“creative, imaginative, right-brained, concerned with values, emotional commitment, and 
energy,” that seeks to “imagine an ideal vision of what we would want our future to be.” 
In contrast, he viewed the traditional approach to planning as “rigorously analytical, left 
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brain(ed), quantitative, good at programmable planning” (p. 213). Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, 
and Lampel (2005) picked up these themes and described the design approach to 
planning as a process of conception while Borja de Mozota (2003) viewed the design 
approach to planning as an integration of design into the strategic formulation process.  
There are many attractive features to the design approach to planning. Some include 
multidisciplinary collaboration, which aids in engagement, problem-solving and innovative 
solutions (Kinnaman & Bleich, 2004). Design also enables organizations to tackle complex, 
“wicked”3 problems, such as helping large systems designs their future (Roberts, 2014). In 
addition, the design planning process outlines a blue print for organizational change, by 
identifying conditions supportive of such change (Nadler & Tushman, 1997).  
2. Army’s Interest in Design 
In 2007, the School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) developed a design 
curriculum called the Art of Design as part of TRADOC’s effort to incorporate design 
planning to address complex military problems. The six-week course was divided into 
five modules: critical thinking, foundations for design exploration, design methodology, 
communication, and leading design. Based on feedback from the Art of Design course, 
and insights gathered from SAMS’ design students who participated in Unified Quest 
exercises,4 TRADOC published Pamphlet 525-5-500, Commander’s Appreciation and 
Campaign Design (CACD) in 2008 to signal its intention to incorporate the design 
approach into doctrine (Banach, 2009, pp. 98–99).  
Current U.S. Army doctrine lists Army Design Metholodogy (ADM) as one of the 
three planning methodologies for Army leaders.5 ADM is defined as a methodology for 
applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar 
problems and approaches to solving them (Department of the Army, 2012, p. 7). The 
                                                 
3 A wicked problem is defined as a problem that cannot be completely described or completely 
answered (Rittel & Webber, 1973).  Design problems are often considered “wicked” (Cross, 2006).  
4 Unified Quest is an annual U.S. Army war game sponsored by TRADOC, Joint Forces Command 
and SOCOM with participation of members of the interagency, academia, and military from around the 
world to discuss responses to global future conflicts. 
5 The other two planning methods are Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and Troop Leading 
Procedure (TLP). 
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ADM process consists of framing the operational environment, framing the problem, and 
developing operational approaches—in the form of a design concept—to solve the 
problem. The design concept reflects the commander’s conceptual understanding of the 
environment and the problem, and serves as the link between design and detailed 
planning. Based on the understanding developed during ADM, the commander issues 
guidance to the planning staff for more detailed planning using MDMP (Department of 
the Army, 2012, p. 7; Banach, 2009, pp. 100–102; School of Advanced Military Studies 
[SAMS], 2010, pp. 131–140). However, the introduction of design planning, particularly 
ADM, into the U.S. Army has not been without challenges. 
Since U.S. Army doctrine officially adopted ADM in the 2010 publication of FM 
5-0 The Operation Process, there has been no shortage of discussions among 
commanders, planners, and academics regarding the metholology, its potential 
applications, and the many barriers to its integration into Army operations (Banach, 2009; 
Buchanan, 2012; Kober, 2010; Nocks, 2010, Shatzer, 2014; Swain, 2014). The criticisms 
cover a wide spectrum: inconsistent and confusing terminology and description of design 
(Martin, 2010); lack of clearly defined relationship between design and detailed planning 
(Kober, 2010, pp. 5–9; Nocks, 2010, pp. 7–8); an overly complicated and elitist Army 
design process (Buchanan, 2012; Shatzer, 2014, pp. 11–12); and an ADM process that 
discourages creativity (Shatzer, 2014, pp. 27–28). Wolters (2012) summarizes the issues 
associated with the introduction of ADM into the U.S. Army in research sponsored by 
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (Table 2). Among 
Wolters’ (2012) findings, the most consistent, and significant issues are the conceptual 
barriers, attributed mostly to the inconsistent definitions/descriptions of design 
terminology and methodology, which lead to confusion and additional barriers to ADM’s 
integration into the Army planning process (pp. 9–16). 
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Table 2.   Summary of Barriers to Integrating Design into Army Operations 
(from Wolters, 2012) 
 
 
3. Capstone Approach 
This capstone will apply the design approach to planning to assist the CA 
Regiment in creating a strategic design for its future. However, rather than following the 
Army’s approach to design, this capstone will employ Design Thinking—a process of 
creating, innovating, and problem solving to invent the future (Roberts, 2014).  
Defined as a process in which people from multiple perspectives and disciplines 
collaborate to solve problems creatively (Brown & Wyatt, 2007; d. school, 2013; 
Roberts, 2014; Rose & Kelly, 2013), Design Thinking is the methodology of choice for 
this capstone. It enables the authors not only to analyze gaps in performance as identified 
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by the archival record,6 but also to capture stakeholders’ insights that will prompt 
innovative solutions to close those gaps. The goal is to develop a strategic design for CA 
2025 that supports the Army’s 2025 Vision.  
F. CAPSTONE STRUCTURE 
This capstone is organized into seven chapters. Chapter I introduces the Army 
2025 strategic vision to provide a context for this capstone: the creation of a strategic 
design for CA 2025. Chapter I also summarizes the traditional approaches to planning 
and explains why they are inadequate given the complex challenges facing CA. The 
chapter then introduces the design approach to planning and signals the capstone 
project’s value-added contribution, the use of Design Thinking as a methodology to 
produce a strategic design.  
Chapter II describes the methodology of Design Thinking used to create CA’s 
strategic design. It summarizes the unique features of Design Thinking and outlines the 
Design Thinking methodology: discovery; problem definition; ideation; prototyping; and 
testing. The chapter concludes with a description of the application of Design Thinking to 
the CA Regiment and the steps taken to produce CA’s strategic design.  
Drawing from archival records and discussions with stakeholders, Chapter III 
presents the findings of the Discovery Phase of Design Thinking. Archival research 
summarizes CA’s past and present strategic direction and the current state of the CA 
Regiment. Discussions with stakeholders—both CA and non-CA personnel—offer 
important insights and divergent perspectives on CA’s ongoing challenges.  
Section one of Chapter IV identifies CA’s major challenges and problems, Define 
Problem Phase. Section two summarizes and prioritizes the creative ideas generated to 
address these problems, Ideation Phase.  
                                                 
6 Since 2006, there have been various efforts to identify and address CA capability gaps, including the 
2009 CSIS study (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009), the 2011 Joint Readiness Oversight Council Memorandum 
(JROCM) 162-11, and the CA Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) by TRADOC Analysis Center–Fort 
Lee (Little, 2013, p. 29). There have also been academic theses and monographs published by the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), U.S. Army War College, and U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 
to examine the CA Regiment’s ongoing challenges. These past CA studies, however, have utilized variants 
of the traditional strategy development in drafting their recommended solutions. 
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Chapter V introduces the design team’s prototypes developed to make the creative 
ideas more concrete and tangible, Prototyping Phase.  
Chapter VI summarizes the feedback received on various iterations of the 
prototypes, Testing Phase.  
Chapter VII discusses the proposed phased implementation of CA 2025, including 
the CA leadership’s next steps to operationalize the prototypes. In addition, the authors 
discuss the potential of using Design Thinking methodology to support the change 
process. The chapter concludes with a summary of the lessons learned. 
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II. METHODOLOGY  
Design Thinking is the methodology used in this capstone to suggest a new 
strategic design for CA. It is defined as a process in which people from multiple 
perspectives and disciplines collaborate to create new products, processes, services and 
strategic designs (Acumen & IDEO, 2014; d. school, 2013; Roberts, 2014; Rose & Kelly, 
2013).  
This chapter describes the basic features of Design Thinking, introduces the Stanford 
D School five-phase Design Thinking model, and describes how Design Thinking is used to 
guide the CA community in creating its strategic design for the future. 
A. BASIC FEATURES OF DESIGN THINKING 
1. Human-Centered Design 
Design Thinking seeks to derive tailored-made solutions to solve design 
challenges (Acumen & IDEO, 2014, ch. 1). Designs are not solely judged in terms of the 
technological features or their economic viability. Good designs pursue the “sweet spot” 
that integrates people’s needs with technological feasibility and economic viability. For 
example, Kellogg’s discovery of hospital patients’ need for an alternative in breakfast 
choices was human-centered, which laid the foundation for a billion dollar company 
(Thomsen, 2013). Launching a design process, thus, begins with understanding the 
problems people are facing, especially their latent needs, to order to come up with 
creative solutions. Creative designs that emerge from the design process then are assessed 
in terms of their technological features and costs.  
2. Radical Collaboration 
Design Thinking requires radical collaboration among its designers. Such 
collaboration brings group members from different backgrounds and specializations to work 
together to solve problems, “Harnessing collective perspectives” and “building on the ideas 
of others” (d.school, 2013, pp. 3–28), increases a group’s potential to surface new ideas and 
generate creative solutions, and potentially launching transformational change (Page, 2014).  
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3. Visual and Embodied Learning 
Visual learning is the visual representation of ideas and concepts to help designers 
understand complex ideas and to identify points of difference and similarity. All design 
work needs to be visually displayed to help the team chart its progress over time. 
(Acumen & IDEO, 2014, ch. 1). Embodied learning, often described as “thinking with 
one’s hands,” challenges designers to think more deeply about the problem by translating 
their deep thoughts and ideas into the physical realm. When combined, visual and 
embodied learning aid designers in embracing abstract concepts, which then may become 
the source of new inspiration for a given problem or challenge.  
4. Bias Toward Action 
Design Thinking is action-oriented. Rather than spending the bulk of allotted time 
mired in analysis and abstract discussions, the design team moves quickly toward 
building things to anchor the team’s deliberations on what ideas or concepts work and 
which do not. The building starts with low-resolution prototypes and then with testing 
and feedback moves to higher and higher resolutions when the feedback is positive 
(d.school, 2015).  
5. Design Space 
Design Thinking’s physical space is open and designed with movable furniture to 
enable collaboration and support design activities. It has plenty of whiteboards for 
displaying sticky post-it notes and other creative items. Walls typically are covered with 
the results of brainstorming, user statements, pictures, etc. to aid in the creative process.  
B. STANFORD D SCHOOL FIVE-PHASE MODEL OF DESIGN THINKING7 
Stanford’s Hasso Platner Institute of Design (D School) was founded in 2005 by 
David Kelley, a Stanford professor of Mechanical Engineering (d.school, 2012). Kelley’s 
human-centered design work (Rose & Kelly, 2013) informs Stanford’s integrative 
approach to Design Thinking. It combines creative and analytical approaches, insists on 
                                                 
7 There are other design thinking models—IDEO, Acumen, Nueva, etc.—but the authors chose 
Stanford’s model. 
 15
cross-disciplinary collaboration, draws on “methods of engineering and design, and 
[integrates] them with ideas from the arts, tools from the social sciences, and insights 
from the business world” (d.school, 2015).  
Design Thinking begins with a design challenge—usually in the form of a problem, 
issue, or question facing a company or organization. Discussions also specify the design 
constraints imposed by the project’s sponsor, such as time, resources, or other limitations. 
To address the problem, issue, or question, a design team then launches the five-phase 
Design Thinking model (Figure 1): empathize, define, ideate, prototype, and test.  
 
Figure 1.  Stanford University Five-Phase Design Model 
(from d.school, 2014, p. 7) 
1. The Empathize Phase 
The Empathize Phase initiates the exploration of the problem and its context. The 
designer’s goal is to observe, listen, and learn from the people who live with the problem 
in order to understand their perspectives and fundamental needs. As Tim Brown (2009) 
describes it, the “real goal is … helping people to articulate the latent needs they may not 
even know they have” (p. 40).  
There are many ways to gather information on people’s needs, including 
examining archival records and observing people in their work. A third way is to conduct 
face-to-face discussions in the person’s environment (d.school, 2014). A two-person team 
works well, with one individual asking questions and the other recording the responses. 
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Questions should facilitate a natural conversation and evoke stories, often prompted by 
“why” to probe for richer and deeper experiences. The second designer captures the 
themes of the conversation and the non-verbal reactions that will enable the designers to 
interpret the person’s stories and experiences.  
2. The Problem Definition Phase 
The Problem definition Phase reframes the design challenge. Often design 
challenges are not well articulated and represent only the presenting problem and not the 
underlying problem or issue facing the organization. The design team then may need to 
reformulate the problem statement after gathering information from the Empathy Phase.  
Two tools to assist the designers to reformulate the problem are Empathy Maps 
and Point of View statements. An Empathy Map, as shown in Figure 2, is divided into 
four quadrants. The upper left quadrant captures the person’s key words and phrases 
during the conversation. The lower left quadrant captures the person’s nonverbal actions. 
The upper right quadrant describes the designer’s interpretation of what the person 
actually thinks (not what is said, but what the designer thinks the person actually means). 
The lower right quadrant requires the designer to interpret what the person is actually 
feeling. Thus, the right-hand side of the empathy map reflects the designer’s 
interpretation, not the interviewee’s direct statements or his actions. Since thoughts and 
feelings cannot be observed directly, the designer must infer by paying careful attention 
to the person’s language, tone, and word choices. Utilizing these four quadrants aids the 
designer in capturing a person’s thoughts and feelings, which can then be used to help 
reframe a problem.  
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Figure 2.  An Example Empathy Map  
A Point of View Statement (POV), shown in Figure 3, helps the designer 
synthesize the information collected from all the conversations and Empathy Maps. The 
statement captures information in three parts: a description of the person in general terms; 
the person’s desires; and the underlying needs driving those desires. To complete the 
problem framing, the design team then synthesizes the POV statements to create an 
overarching problem statement.  
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Figure 3.  An Example POV Statement 
3. The Ideation Phase 
The Ideation Phase generates ideas to address the reframed problem. Using “how 
might we” (HMW) questions, designers launch a brainstorming session where they 
encourage a spectrum of ideas, defer judgment, and build on the ideas offered (Brown, 
2009). Designers typically use both analytical and intuitive thinking to generate a variety 
of ideas, which, according to Euchner (2012) are needed to “create successful 
breakthroughs” in Design Thinking (p. 10). They also use abductive logic to move from 
an observation to a proposed explanation accounting for the observation. The ideal is to 
find the simplest and most likely explanation, or what Martin refers to as “inference to 
the best explanation” (Martin, 2009, p. 8) and others simply describe as “design magic.”  
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When generating new ideas, the goal is to widen the possible solution space for 
the given problem, which is why designers are encouraged to build on others’ ideas 
before selecting their preferred solution (d.school, 2013; d.school, 2014). As the ideas 
increase in number, designers often form idea groupings or categories of similar ideas. 
This visual clustering, in turn, can lead to deeper insights, which generate even more 
ideas. One form of clustering is mind mapping—a visual representation to distinguish 
fundamental relationships within and between the idea groupings. Figure 4 depicts a 
mind mapping utilizing pictures and sticky notes to illustrate related ideas.  
 
Figure 4.  An Example of Mind Mapping (from Roberts, 2015) 
After generating ideas, designers must choose which ideas to carry forward into 
prototyping. First, they establish criteria on which to base their selection, and then they 
vote (d.school, 2014). Ideas receiving the most votes go forward, depending on the 
number of prototypes the designers have the time and resources to build. 
4. The Prototyping Phase 
The Prototyping Phase transforms ideas into physical representations (d. school, 
2013). Prototypes come in many different tangible forms: sketches, models or physical 
objects, role-playing, skits, and videos. Figure 5 illustrates a prototype example.  
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Figure 5.  Exploration Prototype Example (from Roberts, 2015) 
The goal of prototyping is to start with a rough representation of an idea (e.g., 
napkin drawing) to prompt a design team conversation. Rough representations or low-
resolution prototypes are preferred since they constitute small investments in time and 
resources. Designers then move to higher and higher resolution prototypes upon 
discovering what aspects of their prototypes work and which do not, learning from their 
mistakes. “Fail early to succeed sooner” is the designer’s motto (Brown, 2009, p. 17).  
5. The Test Phase 
The Test Phase is an iterative conversation between designers and those for whom 
they are designing. The goal is to solicit feedback on the prototype as a solution to the 
design problem. Testing may result in different outcomes: go forward with the prototype 
and continue making higher resolutions; go forward but with minor modifications; go 
back to the drawing board and select other ideas to prototype; or possibly, return to the 
problem, how it is defined, and repeat the design thinking process. Ideally, through this 
iterative process, a tailored-made solution emerges to the sponsor’s design challenge.  
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C. DESIGN THINKING APPLIED TO CIVIL AFFAIRS 
1. Key Roles 
a. Initiators 
The authors initiated this project due to their concerns over CA’s ability to remain 
strategically relevant in 2025. The CA Regiment is facing existential challenges, and the 
authors chose Design Thinking as the methodology for addressing them.  
b. Sponsor 
1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne) [1st SWTG(A)] partially funded 
this project. During a speech at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), a command 
representative challenged the CA and the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) students to 
transcend the “enabler” term by changing the strategic value of their respective 
organizations. This command representative assessed the importance of the project and 
agreed to provide limited funds for research travel. Throughout the process, the sponsor 
was the liaison that provided the authors’ access to key personnel. 
c. Designer and Facilitators 
Dr. Nancy Roberts was the designer and facilitator of the design workshop, 
guiding the authors and the design team throughout this process. She also recruited 
experienced facilitators (Dr. Frank Barrett, Ms. Ann Gallenson, Ms. Anita Salem, and 
Ms. Eleanor Uhlinger) to assist with the facilitation. Together they contributed over 30 
years of invaluable Design Thinking experience to the process. 
d. Design Team 
The initial design team consisted of the authors. Eighteen others then joined the 
effort during a four-day onsite Design Thinking Workshop at NPS. The 20-member 
design team members, gathered from across the force, provided the following 
representation: one from U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), three 
from U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations (Airborne) 
[USACAPOC(A)], one from 1st SWTG(A), five from 95th Civil Affairs Brigade 
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(Airborne) [95th CA BDE(A)], five from 85th CA BDE, and three from NPS. They 
represented a small sample of CA professionals in terms of gender, age, ranks, 
deployments, unit assignments and other factors. The design team consisted of 19 males 
and one female; their ages ranged from 33 to 45 years old, with an average age of 39. 
Combined, members of the team possessed over 60 deployments to the following 
countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Syria, Yemen, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kosovo, 
Central African Republic, Bosnia, Armenia, Albania, Azerbaijan, Poland, and 
Macedonia. Their ranks included four LTCs, twelve MAJs, one CPT, one SGM, one 1SG 
and one MSG.  
2. Design Constraints 
The command representative’s guidance contained few constraints. The main 
concern focused on the feasibility of outputs. However, the project did have constraints in 
terms of resources, time, and organizational divisions.  
In this fiscally constrained environment, funds limited the number of discussions 
and visits during the Discovery Phase. Given such constraints, the authors chose Ft. 
Bragg, NC—the home station for the majority of the participating organizations: 1st 
SWTG(A), 95th CA BDE(A), USACAPOC(A), IMSG  to conduct in-person discussions 
with stakeholders. All other discussions with personnel outside of Ft. Bragg, NC were 
held via email, telephonic conference, and video teleconference (VTC), etc. In addition, 
some personnel were not considered for the design team due to a lack of funds. 
Limited time also constrained this project. The senior-leader selection process of 
design participants was truncated and focused on selecting the best available person, 
rather than the best person for the workshop. The four-day workshop limited the time 
designers could discuss and produce prototypes, and some personnel had to leave the 
workshop before its conclusion to resume their command duties. An additional test phase 
at Ft. Bragg, NC raised issues about the prototypes that the authors’ capstone timeline did 
not allow them to investigate. Finally, senior leaders outside the Civil Affairs community 
seek more input from non-CA personnel to complete the project. The authors will 
recommend another design workshop to address those leaders’ concerns. 
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Bridging the organizational divides proved to be another challenge. The authors’ 
experiences primarily have been on active duty within the 95th CA BDE(A) and 1st 
SWTG(A), which made finding informal leaders from other organizations to assist in the 
Discovery Phase and the selection of workshop participants difficult. In addition, the 
authors strove to manage relationships among the organizations to ensure the project was 
viewed as a community endeavor. 
3. Design Thinking Process 
a. Phase 1: Discovery/Empathize 
The Discovery/Empathize8 Phase began when the authors conducted archival 
research into CA by examining Army assessments, JROCM 162-11, the CA CBA by 
TRAC-LEE. The authors also reviewed academic theses and monographs published by 
the NPS, USAWC, and CGSC. In addition, authors probed numerous open source web 
pages, such as Defense Video and Imagery Services (DVIDS), organizational Facebook 
pages, Combatant Command (COCOM) web pages, and a variety of news websites. 
Other unclassified data sources included the Civil Information Management Data 
Processing System (CIMDPS), a 95th CA BDE(A) database that contains survey data 
from operational deployments and the USACAPOC(A) Command Brief that outlined 
several U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) CA deployments. These data sources allowed the 
authors to analyze the CA Regiment using visual graphic depiction via ARCGIS and 
Social Network Analysis (SNA), both of which are illustrated in Chapter III.  
Building on their archival research, the authors expanded their exploration to 
include discussions with members of the CA Regiment—1st SWTG (A), U.S. Army John 
F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), 1st SFC(A), 
USACAPOC(A), Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG), 95th CA 
BDE(A), 85th CA BDE, and other CA personnel serving organizations across DOD and 
Department of State (DOS). In addition, the authors reached out to nine personnel outside 
                                                 
8 The authors slightly modified the Stanford Design Thinking model for the CA community. 
Specifically the 1st phase, empathize, was characterized as discovery. The modified phase is still human-
centered; the addition clarifies the authors’ process to discover the context from the CA Regiment’s 
archival field as well.  
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the CA Regiment in Forces Command (FORSCOM), U.S. Army Armor School, 
Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) NCO Academy (NCOA), U.S. Army Pacific 
(USARPAC), Pentagon, U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM), DOS, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These contributors 
included one senior Special Forces (SF) officer, one senior Armor officer, and seven 
senior CA officers.  
Discussions with the above personnel revolved around the following themes:  
 CA’s strategic narrative  
 CA Regiment’s ongoing challenges  
 Opportunities for the CA Regiment 
 The threats facing the CA Regiment 
 Suggestions for improvements in the CA Regiment 
The authors expressed gratitude to the discussants for their contribution, requested 
support from their organizations in the form of personnel to attend the upcoming NPS 
design workshop, and indicated this project will be published the summer of 2015. 
The Discovery/Empathize Phase continued when an 18-person design team joined 
the authors for a four-day NPS Design Workshop 3–6 March, 2015. After the workshop 
designer and facilitator introduced the team to Design Thinking and the team crafted its 
rules of engagement, the expanded team, now augmented to 20 people, reviewed the 
authors’ initial results in the Discovery Phase, which included an overview of the future 
environment, the current state of CA, and archival highlights, in order to establish a 
common understanding among the whole team. In addition, the design team broke into 
subgroups of two to three individuals to discuss the above themes with two senior SF 
officers, four academics, five mid-grade CA officers, and one Marine Special Operations 
officer. A total number of 21 discussants were involved in the discovery process both 
prior to and during the workshop. 
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b. Phase 2 Problem Definition 
Based on the archival data and the 21 Empathy Maps and POV statements (see 
illustrations in Chapter IV), which were used to organize data from the discussions, the 
next step called for the design team to identify challenges/problems that CA needed to 
address. Writing one problem per sticky note, the design team placed sticky notes on a 
wall for all to see. Then a subset of designers quickly reorganized the sticky notes into 
affinity diagrams—groupings around a common theme. As the design team began to see 
how the common themes might be interconnected, discussion ensued and insights 
emerged. The design team then identified a core problem: CA lacked a common identity 
and that lack drove many other problems the team identified.  
c. Phase 3 Ideate—Generating Ideas 
The design team’s ideation focused on generating new ideas for a CA identity 
statement. Working independently, three subgroups generated new identity statements 
following the guidelines in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6.  Questions for Identity 
d. Phase 4 Prototyping 
(1) Step 1. Each subgroup briefed its version of the CA identity statement to 
the other two. Rather than vote on a preferred identity statement, three design team 
members, one from each subgroup, worked to combine the best elements of their three 
versions in a “fishbowl” as the other design team members observed. The final version 
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went through slight modification by the 20-person design team and then was 
unanimously accepted. The statement can be found in Chapter V.  
(2) Step 2. The design team then turned to the remaining problems identified 
in Phase 2, Problem Definition. The workshop designer asked the design team to vote on 
the most important problems to address given the new identity statement. Team members 
quickly identified the major problem areas: branding, strategic messaging, education, 
selection and recruitment, training, force structure, talent management, information and 
knowledge management, culture, career management, generational gap, resources, 
metrics and feedback, and benefactor.  
The workshop designer then asked team members to “vote with their feet” and 
stand next to the problem area in which they had a personal interest. The team members 
then reconfigured the problem areas and formed three new subgroups to work on 
prototypes: strategic messaging and branding; human resources management; and force 
structure. Details on all prototypes can be found in Chapter V.  
e. Phase 5 Test: Workshop Feedback 
The design team gathered feedback on the prototypes from different sources. Each 
subgroup provided feedback to other sub-groups on their prototypes. The design team 
also requested feedback on their prototypes from individuals who had participated in the 
Discovery Phase. A senior officer also provided feedback from a strategic perspective.  
(1) Post-Workshop Feedback. Following the workshop, the design team 
continued to refine the prototypes, based on field experts’ opinions, institutional norms, 
and the Army’s change process. For example, the authors contacted a marketing 
professor for assistance with branding efforts, and senior leaders provided knowledge and 
understanding on how to navigate the Army change process. 
(2) Feedback from CA Regiment. The authors and available design team 
members assembled at Fort Bragg, NC to present the four main prototypes—identity, 
strategic messaging and branding, human resource management, and force structure—to 
the CA Regiment in three different sessions: one for senior-level leaders, one for 
battalion and company leaders, and one for team leaders. In addition to the personnel 
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attending the three sessions, the authors received additional feedback through VTC, 
regular teleconference capabilities, and emails to reach a wider audience within the CA 
Regiment. 
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III. DISCOVERY PHASE 
A. ARCHIVAL RECORD 
The CA archival record is vast and complex. This chapter summarizes the CA 
Regiment’s current threats and opportunities and the distribution of its forces viewed 
through the lens of geospatial analysis and social network analysis. Appendix A offers a 
more extensive picture of its lineage from its inception to 2011. It documents the debates 
concerning CA’s strategic direction, brand, organizational design, and culture. Appendix 
B provides an overview of CA’s global presence by COCOMs from 2006–2014.  
1. Threats from the Environment 
CA’s operational environment is increasingly complex and unstable. In examining 
the future operating environment, the Strategic Landpower Task Force—chartered by the 
U.S. Army, the U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM)—highlights the threat of hybrid warfare involving multiple entities, the 
growing capacity of non-state actors to challenge state authorities and destabilize regions, 
and the increasing pace and mutability of human interactions across boundaries (Odierno, 
Amos, & McRaven, 2013). Similarly, Pamphlet 525-3-1 Win in a Complex World 
published by TRADOC in 2014 to outline the new U.S. Army Operating Concept, 
describes a complex environment characterized by growing urbanization (Department of 
the Army, 2014b, pp. 12–13).  
In the fifth installment of its Global Trends series intended to stimulate strategic 
thinking, the National Intelligence Council (2012) describes the future global trends in 
2030. Some of these trends are more directly relevant to the operational environments 
where CA forces deploy. For example, as urbanization continues to grow, 60 percent of the 
world population (4.9 billion people) is projected to reside in urban centers by 2030 (p. v), 
making the human terrain in these densely populated areas much more complex. Power is 
expected to be more diffuse with the growing number of state and non-state actors, limiting 
multilateral governance and fragmenting the political landscape. Social, economic, and 
political changes fuel a governance gap as countries move through different stages of 
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autocracy or democracy. As approximately 50 countries, concentrated primarily in the 
Middle East, Africa, Southeast and Central Asia, transition from autocracy to democracy, 
more political turmoil is expected with a destabilizing effect on the operational 
environment (p. vii). Politically dissonant, youthful ethnic minorities in countries with 
mature populations increase the risk of intrastate conflicts, especially with the aid of 
communications technologies to facilitate social movements. The risks of interstate 
conflicts also increase as new regional powers emerge and change the dynamics of the 
international system. Moreover, an increasingly diverse ideological landscape, coupled 
with wider access to lethal and disruptive technologies, will lead to higher potential for 
conflicts where the use of violence is no longer the monopoly of the states (p. ix). 
2. Threats from Competition 
Stanton (2010) cites a 2009 paper by USAR Major Brad Striegel titled, “Civil 
Affairs Functional Specialty Review” to discuss how ad hoc constructs, such as the 
Human Terrain System (HTS), Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and 
Agricultural Development Teams (ADTs)9 filled the capability gaps that CA “should 
have nurtured, developed and updated.” Capabilities traditionally identified as CA core 
competencies—cultural knowledge, civil information management (CIM), CMO 
planning and coordination with UAPs, HN and coalition partners, and CA functional 
specialties—have been, to various degrees, neglected by CA practitioners. This neglect 
has undermined the branch’s strategic relevance and threatened its allocation of resources 
in an increasingly fiscally constrained environment.  
a. Human Terrain System 
With the U.S. intelligence staff’s traditional focus on the enemy—through collection 
and analysis of human intelligence (HUMINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT), and significant 
activity (SIGACT) reports—information on the political, economic, and sociocultural 
environment was often neglected by the S-2 shops (Flynn, Pottinger & Batchelor, 2010, pp. 
7–8), highlighting a capability gap in cultural intelligence. Consequently, the U.S. Army and 
                                                 
9 Run by the National Guard. 
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the U.S. Marine Corps intelligence schools adjusted their programs to include cultural 
analysis training for both enlisted personnel and officers, as well as provide reach-back 
capability for deployed units (Connable, 2009, p. 58).  
In 2004, the U.S. Army established the TRADOC Culture Center to develop 
cultural training programs for deploying troops and provide them with the cultural 
knowledge needed in OEF and OIF. Similarly, the U.S. Marine Corps established its 
Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) in 2006 to provide pre-
deployment cultural training with embedded civilian social scientists and trainers 
(Connable, 2009, p. 58). In both OIF and OEF theaters, CA personnel and Foreign 
Service officers (FAOs) served as cultural and political advisors to commanders and their 
staffs. Even though the services began to expand the sizes of their CA and FAO forces in 
response to the high demand signal, the gap in cultural capability remained during the 
early years of OEF and OIF (Connable, 2009, pp. 59–61; Golinghorst, 2010, p. 4). 
In 2006, U.S. Army TRADOC jointly developed the HTS program with the Joint 
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). The core of its 
program was to have civilian social scientists and anthropologists embedded with 
deployed troops to improve decision makers’ understanding of the complex sociocultural 
environments in Iraq and Afghanistan (Golinghorst, 2010, p. 4; Lamb, Orton, Davies & 
Pikulsky, 2013, p. 22). HTS deployed Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) to support BDE-
level commands; Human Terrain Analysis Teams (HTATs) to support division-level 
commands; Theater Coordination Elements (TCEs) to support deployed teams, theater 
headquarters (HQs); and Social Science Research and Analysis (SSRA) teams to provide 
support at the theater level by facilitating and analyzing surveys conducted by contracted 
local organizations. In addition, HTS maintained CONUS-based components that 
provided administrative and technical support, training, and reach-back capability 
(Clinton, Foran-Cain, McQuaid, Norman, & Sims, 2010, pp. 1–4).  
The first HTT deployed in February, 2007 to Khost, Afghanistan to support 4th 
Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82nd Airborne successfully as proof-of-concept (Lamb et 
al., 2013, p. 23). Under the renewed lens of the population-centric counterinsurgency 
(COIN) strategy re-energized by General David Petraeus, HTS initially received positive 
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reviews, including a favorable assessment from Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert 
Gates and a congressional testimony of Colonel Martin Schweitzer, the BCT commander 
in Khost. Five HTTs subsequently deployed to Iraq with mixed performance; two teams 
imploded due to “intense personal conflicts” and had to be redeployed (Gezari, 2013; 
Joseph, 2014, p. 14; Lamb et al., 2013, pp. 22–23). However, with the support of U.S. 
Central Command (CENTCOM), Petraeus, and Gates, the HTS program received an 
expanded budget for 26 teams that was subsequently rushed to recruit, train, and field. 
From the very beginning, the HTS program has been marred with systemic problems 
ranging from recruitment, human resourcing, training, mismatched skills, and 
organizational competence, to management, working relationships, and personnel 
disciplinary issues (e.g., fraud, sexual harassment, racism) (Clinton et al., 2010, pp. 2–8; 
Gezari, 2013; Joseph, 2014, pp. 26–31; Lamb et al., 2013, pp. 24–25).  
Among the persistent opposition the HTS has drawn since its inception, 
fundamental criticisms have come from the American Anthropological Association 
(AAA) over ethical issues of anthropological applications in support of the military 
(Gezari, 2013; Joseph, 2014, p. 20) and from members of the military intelligence (MI), 
CA and FAO communities, asserting that HTS attempts to duplicate capabilities that 
already exist—but need further development—in the services (Connable, 2009, pp. 59–
63; Golinghorst, 2010, pp. 25–26). By doctrine, U.S. Army CA conducts civil 
information management (CIM) as one of its five core tasks. CIM is defined as the 
process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and 
internally fused with the supported element, higher HQ, and other USG10 and DOD 
agencies, IGOs,11 and NGOs (Department of the Army, 2014a, p. 3–10). The CIM 
process includes six steps: (1) collection through civil reconnaissance (CR), data mining, 
and collaboration with HN, UAPs, and coalition partners, (2) collation, (3) processing, 
(4) analysis, (5) production, and (6) dissemination. At the core of the CIM process is the 
analysis of civil information to provide decision makers situational understanding and 
knowledge of the civil component of the operational environment, including its political, 
                                                 
10 U.S. government. 
11 Intergovernmental organizations. 
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economic, social, cultural, structural, and informational dimensions (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2013, pp. I-1–12), the very raison d’être for HTS. Connable (2009) also recognizes that 
the capabilities claimed by HTS mirror those doctrinally provided by U.S. Army CA, and 
questions the logic behind such duplication, rather than an improvement of existing 
capabilities in the U.S. military (p. 61). The cost of the HTS program exceeded 600 
million dollars by 2012 (Gezari, 2013), and 720 million dollars to date, by another 
estimate (Gonzalez, 2015).  
Assessments of the HTS have been mixed, from limited success with numerous 
systemic problems (Clinton et al., 2010; Lamb et al., 2013, pp. 26–28), to a deeply flawed 
program that put Afghans and Americans at risk (Gezari, 2013), to even a “poorly 
conceived, grossly mismanaged boondoggle,” and “the costliest social science program in 
history” (Gonzales, 2015). Joseph (2014) further asserts that any successful efforts, as 
perceived by HTS personnel, were “largely at the relatively simple level of cultural 
awareness” instead of at the more strategically sophisticated level of providing 
sociocultural information to inform decision makers (p. 39). HTS as an ad hoc program 
has not only distracted DOD from a concerted effort to improve its existing cultural 
capabilities, but also diverted resources from the recruitment, training, and educational 
programs to improve and expand such capabilities in the services (Connable, 2009, p. 
64). After much turmoil, including the removal in 2010 of Steve Fondacaro, the original 
program manager, and Montgomery McFate, the first chief social scientist, reportedly for 
feuding with TRADOC, the HTS program faces an uncertain future with no major role. 
However, HTS is still recruiting and sustaining its training program at Fort Leavenworth, 
KS (Joseph, 2014, pp. 28, 99). In the FY 2016 Army Unfunded Requirements List 
enclosed with the recent request from Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) to the House 
Committee on Appropriations for additional funding, a pilot HTS program for PACOM 
was itemized together with a pilot Open Source intelligence (OSINT) program, totaling 
28 million dollars, further indicating that the HTS program is still very much active 
(Odierno, 2015). 
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b. Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
In OEF and OIF, PRTs represented another ad hoc construct to implement CMO 
in support of stability operations. Joint doctrine defines a PRT as a civil-military team—
with interagency and multinational partners—capable of independently conducting 
operations to stabilize a part of the OE12 by enhancing the legitimacy and the 
effectiveness of the HN government (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013, p. II–22). The 
reconstruction and stabilization program in Afghanistan began with the Coalition 
Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLC) staffed by U.S. Army CA personnel during the early 
phase of OEF. The program was expanded in 2002, first with the deployment of a 
Coalition Joint CMO Task Force (CJCMOTF) and subsequently the creation of the first 
PRTs in Afghanistan with a force protection component and interagency representatives 
on staff (Perito, 2005, p. 2; Sellers, 2007, pp. 5–6). As a means of burden-sharing among 
the U.S.-led Coalition, the number of PRTs grew to 32 by 2011 under three main models: 
U.S., German, and British. The majority of the PRTs were established and led by the 
United States; some mature U.S.-led PRTs were subsequently handed over to Coalition 
partner countries (Center for Army Lessons Learned [CALL], 2011, pp. 35–39; Perito, 
2005, pp. 3–5; Sellers, 2007, pp. 8–15). Typically, at the core of a U.S.-led PRT was a 
Reserve Component (RC) CA Company that performed the function of a Civil-Military 
Operations Center (CMOC) and provided CATs for the supported BCT. The ad hoc 
nature of the PRTs in Afghanistan resulted in a wide range of challenges and varying 
degrees of operational success, as summarily observed by the Marine Corps Center for 
Lessons Learned (MCCLL) (2007): 
Army Civil Affairs (CA) personnel received 14 weeks of training but said 
that they needed more preparation for the varied tasks needed to 
reconstruct and develop a foreign province. They stressed the need for 
detailed training in negotiating, contract development, evaluating and 
vetting contractors, and program budgeting and management. 
The personnel assigned to a PRT are typically a mix of soldiers, Marines, 
airmen, and sailors of varying ranks, gender, MOSs,13 and active/reserve 
                                                 
12 Operational environment. 
13 Military occupational specialties. 
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components, without regard to specific qualifications. The Sharana PRT 
Commander has an armor MOS and had no civil affairs experience or 
training prior to this assignment. A communications operator may be 
responsible for maintaining the vehicle fleet, while an infantry Marine 
may be responsible for the computer network and SATCOM equipment. 
Many of them are on their first deployment and have a noncombat MOS. 
Personnel assigned to PRTs need more pre-deployment civil affairs 
training and more force protection training, including the use of crew 
served weapons. The U.S. Army has recognized the need for specialized 
training of PRT personnel. U.S. Forces Command has issued specific 
guidance and established web-based training resources. 
Cultural awareness at both the micro and macro level is critical to the 
success of a PRT. In at least one instance, a female U.S. Army Civil 
Affairs (CA) officer filled a critical leadership position. In spite of her 
excellent credentials, she may be being set up for failure because of the 
cultural bias regarding women of the Afghani tribal leadership with whom 
she must negotiate. (pp. 4–5)  
The PRT construct was implemented in Iraq in 2005 with one fundamental 
difference: the teams were under DOS control and led by a senior Foreign Service officer 
(FSO) (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008, p. 5; Sellers, 2007, pp. 17–18). Ten embedded PRTs 
(ePRTs)—also led by a civilian director—were introduced as part of the 2007 surge and 
integrated into BCTs in strategic hot spots to allow BCT commanders more control and 
influence over PRT activities in their assigned areas of responsibility (AORs) (Sellers, 
2007, pp. 20–22).  
Sharing many of the same challenges—lack of resources, qualified personnel, 
training, integration—PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq highlighted another glaring problem: 
inadequate CIM that jeopardized the effectiveness of the reconstruction efforts and 
interagency cooperation (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008, pp. 7–14; Perito, 2005, pp. 11–14; 
Sellers, 2007, pp. 33–40). A more salient lesson was that the PRT construct, as accurately 
observed by senior CA practitioners, was an enhanced CMOC with an integrated civil 
and interagency component (Sellers, 2007, pp. 47–55). Since operating a CMOC is a CA 
core competency, CA should have played a role as an integral component, if not the core 
component of the PRT construct. However, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, CA only had a 
supporting role on a PRT, as one of the “enablers” (CALL, 2011, p. 42). The inadequate 
training and operational experience of the RC CA personnel on the PRT staff did not help 
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the case. As a common practice on U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan, CA personnel were 
subordinate to non-CA military commanders who had little or no prior CMO or CA 
training (MCCLL, 2008, p. 11; Sellers, 2007, pp. 55–61). 
c. Civilian Response Corps and Civilian Expeditionary Workforce 
Shortfalls in CA functional specialties have been widely discussed and recognized 
as a critical capability gap in the RC (Edwards, 2012, pp. 8–17; Florig, 2006, pp. 60–61; 
Kimmey, 2005, p. 18; Mitchell, 2011, pp. 6–10; Stanton, 2010; Storey, 2012, pp. 18–19). 
The fourteen functional specialties—typically acquired by RC CA personnel from 
civilian education and career experience—are organized into six functional specialty 
areas as shown in Figure 7 (Department of the Army, 2014a, p. 2–18). Given the needs 
for civilian expertise in post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations, there have 
been programs by other agencies willing to fill such a capability gap—namely the 
Civilian Response Corps (CRC) under DOS, and the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce 
(CEW) under DOD (Civic, 2013, pp. 149–150).  
 
Figure 7.  Six CA Functional Specialty Areas with 14 Functional Specialties 
(from Department of the Army, 2014a, p. 2–18) 
Historically, the role of overseas post-conflict nation building has defaulted to the 
U.S. military. National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) was issued in 2005 
to promote the whole-of-government approach and provide policy direction for 
interagency cooperation in stability and reconstruction efforts, with the Secretary of 
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State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) as the lead 
agency (Civic, 2013, p. 149; Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, pp. 24–26; Serafino, 2012, pp. 3–
5). The S/CRS proposed the establishment of the CRC in 2006 to create a cadre of 
civilian experts—an active component (CRC-A) of 250 members, a standby component 
(CRC-S) of 2000, and a reserve component (CRC-R) of 200014—trained and equipped 
for overseas deployments in support of stability and reconstruction efforts (Farr, 2012, p. 
22; Serafino, 2012, pp. 14–15). Officially launched in 2008, the CRC continuously 
encountered a series of funding challenges that impeded the development of its three 
components (Farr, 2012, pp. 21–22; Serafino, 2012, pp. 14–21). Van Roosen (2009) 
perceives the establishment of the CRC as a superficial duplication of the functional 
specialty cells in USACAPOC(A) and, hence, potentially an asset to Joint Force 
Commander (JFCs) (p. 15).  
In 2009, under Directive 1404.10 (Department of Defense, 2009), the DOD 
established the CEW to be organized, trained, cleared, equipped, and ready to deploy in 
support of combat operations by the military; contingencies; emergency operations; 
humanitarian missions; disaster relief; restoration of order; drug interdiction; and stability 
operations (p. 1). CEW recruits volunteers from the pool of current civilian, as well as 
former civilian and military DOD employees, for four categories: Emergency Essential 
(E-E) for combat and combat support; Non-Combat Essential (NCE) for non-combat 
support; Capability-Based Volunteer (CBV) as backfill for E-E and NCE; and Capability-
Based Former Employee Volunteer Corps as the reserve for CBV (p. 3). CEW has a 
database of over 17,000 resumes to draw from and hires personnel—excluding DOD 
employees with dual-status National Guard or Reserve Technician—as federal employees 
(Civic, 2013, p. 150; Dunigan, 2012, p. 3). Dunigan (2012) lists the following positions 
filled by CEW personnel (pp. 2–3): 
 Contracting staff (Commander’s Emergency Response Program) 
 Security administration staff 
 Public affairs staff conducting media relations and developing 
communication strategies for deployed U.S. forces 
                                                 
14 CRC-A deployable within 48 hours, CRC-S 30 days, and CRC-R 45–60 days. 
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 Foreign affairs staff 
 General attorneys 
 Transportation specialists performing vehicle maintenance 
 Information technology (IT) managers 
 Language specialists and cultural advisers to U.S. officers 
 Intelligence specialists providing technical and IT support to intelligence 
personnel on U.S. bases in theater 
 Human resources assistance staff 
 AFPAK Hands performing development and government capacity-
building work in Afghanistan 
 Civil engineers working with HN, U.S. contractors, and NGOs on CMO 
projects 
The 2012 report by RAND Corporation also notes that the CEW is evolving and 
potentially transitioning from its voluntary basis to a more steady-state, traditional 
program with position requirements identified by the services (Dunigan, 2012, p. 3). 
Since the DOD has a more robust budget than the DOS, the CEW program potentially 
can be expanded with civilian skillsets similar to those offered by CA functional specialty 
cells and CRC (Civic, 2013, p. 150).  
CRC—currently under the DOS Bureau of Conflict and Stability Operations 
(CSO)15—is projected to grow to 500 for CRC-A, and 4,000 for CRC-R (Serafino, 2012, 
p. 24). Similarly, CEW is projected to grow to a total of 20,000 to 30,000 employees 
(Dunigan, 2013, p. 1). In a hostile fiscal environment of increasing budget constraints, 
competition is inherent among the “service” providers—service in this case being the 
civilian expertise essential to stability and reconstruction efforts. 
                                                 
15 CSO subsumed S/CRS in November 2011. 
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3. Opportunities 
a. The Human Domain 
Time and again, the U.S. has undertaken to engage in conflict without 
fully considering the physical, cultural, and social environments that 
comprise what some have called the “human domain”.  
—General Odierno, General Amos, Admiral McRaven 
It is commonly understood that war is inherently a human endeavor, or a contest 
of wills between or among organized groups (Odierno, Amos, & McRaven, 2013). To 
emphasize the U.S. Army’s role in persistent population-centric operations, Odierno and 
McHugh (2015) further asserts in Army 2025 Vision that, “war, ultimately, is conducted 
on land with adversaries seeking to maintain control over, and often fighting in the midst 
of larger civilian populations” (p. 4). Cleveland and Farris (2014) postulate that, while the 
existence of a human being in conflict is not a new idea, the relevance of human factor in 
conflict has become more salient in modern warfare (p. 40). 
Given the threats from the future operational environments as discussed in the 
previous section, Odierno, Amos and McRaven (2013) assess a growing significance of 
the human domain in future conflicts. Therefore, CA needs to embrace its core 
competency—namely its ability to access, analyze, and influence the relevant 
populations—and continue to develop the required skills to provide JFCs the necessary 
shaping options of the human domain in future conflicts. 
b. The 7th Warfighting Function: Engagement 
In 2014, TRADOC published Pamphlet 525-8-5 (TRADOC PAM 528-8-5) to 
introduce engagement as the 7th Warfighting Function (7th WfF)—or specifically, “the 
related tasks and systems that influence the behaviors of a people, security forces and 
governments”—to address the shortfalls in current Army Concept Framework 
(Department of the Army, 2014c, p. 5). The two components of this new framework of 
engagement are partnership activities, which include CMO, security cooperation 
activities, security assistance, foreign internal defense (FID), and security force assistance 
(SFA); and special warfare activities, which include unconventional warfare (UW), 
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COIN, Civil Affairs Operations (CAO), and Military Information Support Operations 
(MISO) (pp. 12–15). The 7th WfF also emphasizes the importance of interdependence 
among Conventional Forces (CF),16 Special Operations Forces (SOF), and UAPs to share 
information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence through persistent 
engagement (p. 5). 
c. The Global SOF Network 
In the 2013 USSOCOM posture statement to Congress, House Armed Services 
Committee Admiral William H. McRaven articulated USSOCOM’s vision to build a 
Global SOF Network (GSN) to “support interagency and international partners, in order 
to gain expanded situational awareness of emerging threats and opportunities,” through 
the persistent presence of small SOF footprint in critical locations, under the authority of 
the geographical combatant commands (GCCs) and COMs (McRaven, 2013a, p. 4). 
Through Civil-Military Support Elements (CMSEs), USSOF provide direct support to the 
interagency efforts to counter violent extremist ideology and diminish drivers of violence 
exploited by al-Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations (VEOs) (p. 5). Civil 
Military Engagement (CME)—the formal USSOCOM program of record under which 
CMSEs are deployed to over 25 countries to support the GCCs, Theater Special 
Operations Commands (TSOCs), and Chiefs of Mission (COMs) through regionally 
synchronized activities—plays an important role in USSOCOM efforts to build the GSN. 
CME is a globally synchronized and regionally coordinated program of country-
specific and regional actions executed through, and with indigenous and interagency 
partners, to eliminate the underlying conditions and core motivations for local and 
regional support to violent extremist organizations and their networks (Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2013, p. II–6). CME supports the indirect approach in shaping the environment to 
defeat VEOs as outlined in Concept Plan 7500 (CONPLAN 7500) DOD Strategy Against 
Terrorism. In the 2008 USSOCOM posture statement to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, Admiral Eric T. Olsen (2008) emphasized that the indirect approach requires 
more time to achieve effects, but “ultimately will be the decisive effort” (p. 5). As he 
                                                 
16 CF and General Purpose Forces (GPF) will be used interchangeably in this capstone. 
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reported then, GCCs were increasingly requesting CMSEs to enhance their indirect 
operations, as part of the NA efforts, by enabling partners to combat VEOs, deterring 
tacit and active support for VEOs, and eroding support for extremist ideologies (p. 8). 
ATP 3-57.80 Civil Military Engagement succinctly describes the CME concept 
(Department of the Army, 2013):  
The TSOC in support of the GCC plans, coordinates, requests, and 
manages the CME at the theater level. CME is a subset of NA.17 CME is 
synchronized with the GCC’s contingency and theater campaign plans, as 
well as the DOS mission strategic plan of the AMEMB in the HN where 
operations are conducted. CME is designed to identify and address critical 
civil vulnerabilities in undergoverned [sic] and ungoverned areas or high-
threat environments. 
CME is USSOCOM’s conceptual contribution, and it is part of the DOD’s 
strategy to build partner capacity (BPC) in a preventive, population-
centric, and indirect approach to enhance the capability, capacity, and 
legitimacy of partnered indigenous governments. The successful execution 
of CME operations addresses the causes or drivers of instability or popular 
grievances of the indigenous population that can be exploited by 
destabilizing elements within the operational environment to include 
violent extremists. (p. 4–1) 
CMSEs are small, task-organized CA elements manned, trained and equipped by 
the 95th CA BDE(A). When deployed, a CMSE is placed under the operational control of 
the TSOC and provides direct support to the COM, while working closely with members 
of the country team, the interagency, and other USSOF elements in country in support of 
theater security cooperation (TSC) through regionally synchronized activities. Through 
persistent engagement with HN populace, civilian institutions and military, as well as 
partnerships or ad hoc working relationships with IGOs and NGOs, the CMSE conducts 
and facilitates targeted CMO activities to build partner capacity and reduce and mitigate 
civil vulnerabilities, while enhancing access and influence for the TSOC, GCC and the 
country team. There are currently CMSEs deployed to over 25 countries in support of 
SOCCENT, SOCAF, SOCEUR, SOCSOUTH and SOCPAC. 
                                                 
17 Nation assistance. 
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The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) (Department of Defense, 2012) 
directed the U.S. military to, whenever possible, “develop innovative, low-cost, and 
small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives,” given the new fiscal 
realities and reduction in resources (p. 3). Such direction was echoed in the SOCOM 2020 
vision by Admiral McRaven (2013b): 
Given the increasing complexity and uncertainty in the global 
environment, it is imperative USSOCOM become more agile, even more 
flexible, and ready for a broader range of contingencies. We shall achieve 
this through the development of globally networked, innovative, low-cost, 
and small footprint approaches to achieve our nation’s security objectives. 
Success in the future demands unprecedented levels of trust, confidence, 
and understanding—conditions that can’t be surged. 
Effective networks are best created before a crisis. Building networks 
requires relationships and relationships require trust. Building trust 
requires time and commitment. Persistent engagement based on mutual 
trust and understanding best positions the force to build relationships. SOF 
must sustain and then improve capacity to shape the operational 
environment while building relationships based on trust and sharing 
experiences, hardships and knowledge with our partners. 
In support of Ambassadors and GCCs, aligned with our interagency 
partners, SOF will provide small unit, forward-based persistent presence 
closely integrated with our partners to protect our interests and provide 
rapid response. We simply cannot surge trust at the time of crisis. (pp. 1, 
5) 
CMSEs will be an essential part of the GSN as envisioned by Admiral McRaven, 
as these forward-based, persistent-presence SOF teams with small footprint continue to 
develop trust and relationships with not only the HN partners, but also the country teams, 
and the UAPs in the priority countries where they operate. 
4. Current State of CA through Mapping Analyses 
The authors continued to explore and discover the CA community context through 
mapping analyses. First, geospatial analysis is used to visually depict the global CA presence 
from 2006 to 2014. Second, SNA is used to explore the CA community as a whole in 2014 
among command, operational, training, and partnerships relationships. Lastly, the authors use 
a traditional line and block chart to illustrate the current state of the CA community.  
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a. Geospatial Analysis  
Given the active duty CA expansion beginning in 2006, the authors wanted to 
identify what CA expansion looked like in terms of operational deployments. Using 
Google Earth, ARCGIS, and other software tools to illuminate the temporal and 
geospatial features of the deployed CA units, the authors explored the spatial 
relationships among the specific CA deployments from 2006 to 2014 and the 2014 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) objectives. Based on an analysis of CA 
deployments by components, the authors identified issues central to understanding the 
CA’s critical role.  
The two-mode data for our analysis consists of CA deployments, by entity and 
country, between 2006 and 2014. The authors relied almost exclusively on open-source 
data, such as DVIDS, organizational Facebook pages, COCOM webpages, and a variety 
of news websites. Other unclassified data sources include the CIMDPS and the 
USACAPOC(A) Command Brief. 
The authors first charted CA deployments by entity and location using open-
source data coded in a two-mode formatted spreadsheet. Then, after identifying an 
appropriate base map with country shape files, the authors annotated and adjusted the 
map projection and datum. The coded data was then incorporated through the Layer 
Properties menu and each country was color-coded based on the presence of a specific 
CA entity, or a combination of CA entities (i.e., Iraq and Afghanistan). Once that coding 
was complete, various documents, such as the QDR and individual COCOM Commander 
Posture Statements were reviewed in order to identify priorities for resources and assets. 
Lastly, the geospatial relationship between the CA entity and deployment locations was 
analyzed in order to determine how they supported the QDR priorities, as well as to 
identify and record any other significant observations. 
As depicted on the map in Figure 8, the countries in dark purple are countries in 
which U.S. Army CA had a presence between 2006 and 2014. Presence is defined as 
either a persistent presence, CMSE, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), liaisons, 
and/or regular exercises. The chart depicts just how CA deployments to 78 countries—
39.7 percent of the 196 recognized countries of the world minus North America—during 
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the past eight years have supported the QDR’s second and third pillars to “Build Security 
Globally” and “Project Power and Win Decisively.” Specific instances are highlighted 
during the COCOM analysis portion (See Appendix B). Another point of interest with 
regard to the significant number of countries in which CA forces have had a presence 
during the past eight years is that when compared to the much promoted “Global SOF 
Network,” CA forces alone have been operating in as many, if not more countries (78 v. 
75 countries) (McRaven, 2013a).  
 
Figure 8.  Global CA Presence from 2006–2014 
According to former SOCOM commander, Admiral McRaven, this robust, global 
presence is critical in order to  
support to public diplomacy, and interagency efforts to counter violent 
extremist ideology and diminish the drivers of violence that al-Qa’ida and 
other terrorists exploit…neither we nor our partners can kill our way to 
victory in this fight. These efforts require continuity and perseverance. 
Episodic engagement is inefficient and has the potential to create 
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animosity due to unmet expectations by the governments and populations 
we are trying to support. Over the long-run, these proactive activities 
reduce strategic risk, protect American lives, and reduce the need for 
expensive response to terrorist attacks. (McRaven, 2013a) 
Figure 9 graphically depicts CA’s presence from 2006–2014 by component, along 
with a histogram outlining the number of countries in which each CA entity has 
deployed. Based on the data gathered, the highlighted red circle indicates an opportunity 
for the CA Regiment. This particular area illustrates where organizations have had 
operational overlap; it reveals an opportunity for the community to examine knowledge 
sharing and transfer. In addition, the chart suggests that RC CA forces have deployed to 
the most countries, though this should be of no surprise considering it is the largest of the 
three CA entities. What the authors found of particular interest is that the newest of all 
organizations, the 85th CA BDE, has been present in 22 countries despite only being 
active since 2011.  
 
Figure 9.  Global CA Presence (by Component) from 2006–2014 
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The 95th CA BDE(A) and USACAPOC(A) have found a niche by maintaining an 
enduring presence through recurring deployments and/or exercises in low-threat and 
allied theaters in which they conduct low-cost humanitarian assistance programs, and by 
providing training to build military and governmental capacity. Expansion has allowed 
AC CA to focus solely on rapid deployment and initial entry capability in support of SOF 
mission sets. A significant finding is that despite an active duty expansion from one 
battalion to 10 over the course of eight years, RC CA forces have had the most forces 
deployed to the SOUTHCOM, EUCOM, and AFRICOM areas of operation (See 
Appendix A). 
b. Social Network Analysis 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) is used to illuminate the CA community. Everton 
(2012) described SNA it as the process of “detecting and interpreting patterns of social 
ties among actors” (p. 9; de Nooy, Mrvar & Batagelj, 2005, p. 5). SNA is typically used 
for dark networks, although it is becoming more prevalent in examining light networks. 
The focus of this analysis is on the entire CA community at the organizational level 
through its various networks: CA command, CA training, CA operations, and CA 
partnerships. Illumination of this light network informed later discussions concerning 
important players within CA’s environment to inform its strategic design.  
In exploring the CA community, the first step is to define the network boundaries 
from 2006 to 2014, the year when CA officially became a branch and the year this project 
was initiated. The authors used a nominalist approach whereby the researcher defines the 
boundaries to construct the CA network. Two criteria informed this step:  
 The organization must be formally affiliated with the CA Regiment: 95th 
CA BDE(A) and 85th CA BDE in the AC; USACAPOC(A), 7th Civil 
Support Command (7th CSC), and 9th Mission Support Command (9th 
MSC) in the RC; and civilian industries.  
 The organization is deployed in a CA capacity.  
Limiting the examination to U.S. Army CA forces aids in information gathering, 
problem framing, and CA redesign. 
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Further analysis was conducted by looking at relational ties. Everton (2012) posits 
that ties can be anything: resources, affiliations, friendships, kinship, and, etc. There are 
four relations that were used in this project. The first tie is command, where a hierarchal 
relationship exists between two CA units that conduct CA operations. The second tie is 
training, where an organization is responsible for executing a portion of the Civil Affairs’ 
training pipeline. The third tie is operations, where CA units were deployed to a foreign 
countries conducting CA operations-missions, exercises, training foreign militaries, 
assisting with local governance activities, international distastes, etc. The fourth and final 
tie is partnership, where one organization is connected to another organization for 
collaborative activities. 
After defining the network boundaries and establishing relational ties and 
attributes, the authors uploaded the data into the Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA), a 
recent SNA software package that has gained credibility (Everton, 2012). The analyses 
reveals four sub-networks: CA command; CA training; CA operations; and CA 
partnerships. Analyses involve measures of betweenness centrality (an actor who lies on 
the shortest path distance between two other actors); closeness centrality (an actor who is 
closer in path distance to others in the network); eigenvector centrality (an actor who has 
ties to those who are highly centralized); degree centrality (the number of ties an actor 
has (Everton, 2012, p. 398). In addition, other metrics used were network path length, the 
distance between pairs of actors within the network and network diameter—basically, the 
breadth of the network (Everton, 2012). These measures were chosen to aid in identifying 
key organizations in a position to assist with CA’s strategic design through formation, 
implementation, and evaluation. Appendix B provides a more in-depth discussion of the 
four sub-networks of the CA Regiment analyses.  
Figure 10 depicts the CA network; it combines the CA command, CA training, 
CA operational, and CA partnership networks in order to have a comprehensive look at 
the CA community. Figure 10 contains (1) colored nodes that represents different types 
of the organizations, (2) colored links which represents which network the nodes belong 
to, and (3) illustrates the connections within the overall network. Figure 10 is a sociogram 
of the CA Combined Network, and Table 3 provides its metrics. 
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Figure 10.  CA Network 
Table 3.   CA Network Metrics 
 
 
The network is large, consisting of 244 nodes and forms around four clusters that 
are noteworthy. Analysis revealed that the partnership sub-network has more 
centralization across the four measures compared to the other networks, as seen in Table 
3. Within this network, there are four major players indicated by the red circles on Figure 
6: Civil Military Advisor Group (CMAG), Civil Affairs Association (CAA), Friends of 
Civil Affairs (FOCA), and IMSG. Among these influential organizations the CMAG has 
the most partners, and is part of Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) initiative to 
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improve CA strategic value (U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2013). The CA 
Partnership sub-network is the primary network to be leveraged to assist with the 
Regiment’s aims.  
There are several important implications that the authors draw from this social 
network analysis. This information reveals that strategic messaging for the CA Regiment 
needs to occur within the CA Partnership sub-network. There is an opportunity for the 
CA Regiment to signal its external stakeholders within this network with one voice. On 
the other hand, if the community continues to signal and promote different narratives and 
messages, it can only confuse these stakeholders regarding CA’s strategic value.  
c. Force Structure 
An analysis of the current CA force structure reveals some of the issues facing the 
community. Figure 11 outlines the different commands to which CA forces are assigned: 
USSOCOM, FORSCOM, USARPAC, and USAEUR. It also illustrates the size of the RC 
with six flag officer billets and nine BDEs compared to the AC with two BDEs. 
Additionally, Figure 11 highlights the variation in training conducted within the force:  
 AC Officers (38A) and AC NCOs (38B) go through one-week CA 
assessment and selection (CAAS) followed by 42-week CA qualification 
course (CAQC). 
 RC Officers (38A) conduct 20-week distance learning course followed by 
4-week residence course. 
 RC NCOs (38B) attend 4-week reclassification course. 
 RC Officers (38A) and NCOs (38B) attend mobilization training 
conducted by different organizations—1st SWTG(A), 1st TNG BDE(A), 
and 80th TASS CMD.  
This visual depiction illuminates some of the many differences in training within 
the CA Regiment. The implications are that these different training pathways produce 
differences in skills and interpretations of CA roles that manifest in distrust among CA 
forces and a lack of credibility to external stakeholders because of the variations of CA 
skills delivered.  
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Figure 11.  Current CA Force Structure and Training Pipelines 
5. Emergent Themes and Challenges 
From the archival record, the authors identified recurring themes representative of 
the CA Regiment’s ongoing challenges and presented those themes to the design team 
members as a context for further dialogues and discussions during the Design Thinking 
workshop. 
a. 2006 Reassignment of USACAPOC(A) to USAR and Its Implications 
In 2006, all RC CA units under USACAPOC(A) were reassigned to USAR while 
the 96th CA Battalion (Airborne) [96th CA BN(A)] remained under USASOC. Such 
reassignment, commonly referred to as the “CA divorce” by members of the CA 
Regiment, effectively split the Regiment along the AC/RC line with unintended 
consequences at the detriment of the Regiment’s cohesion, interoperability, and overall 
readiness.  
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b. Who Are We?  
CA personnel often identify themselves by the functions they perform (e.g., 
generalists vs. functional specialist), the tasks assigned to them (e.g., project manager, 
HA coordinator), whom they support (e.g., GPF vs. SOF), their mission (e.g., tactical 
CAT vs. CMSE), or a variety of monikers adopted or socialized by various CA 
organizations (e.g., Warrior Diplomat, Master of the Human Domain, and Civil Scout).  
c. CA As “Do-Gooders” (Build Stuff, Give Away Stuff and etc.) 
After years of poorly managed and executed reconstruction activities during OIF 
and OEF by the U.S. military and the interagency, many stakeholders have simply 
equated CA with projects (e.g., wells, schools, clinics) and HA supply drops (e.g., soccer 
balls, rice, bean). These became perceived as the only roles of CA, and were attributed to 
CA even when conducted poorly by non-CA entities.  
d. Burnout of the Force Due to OPTEMPO and its Implications 
The high demand signal for CA, especially during OIF and OEF, resulted in high 
deployment rates and consequently operational fatigue for both RC and AC. Many 
functional specialists left the force, causing a brain drain in the RC. The mass production 
of CA to replenish its ranks diluted the CA brand. 
e. One standard for All versus  Specialized Standards 
Currently multiple different CA training pipelines exist in the U.S. Army, with 
different lengths, qualities, contents, and producing inconsistent levels of skills. 
Additionally, only the AC personnel go through CAAS. The disparity in CA training 
between the RC and AC, and its resultant disparity in the quality of their personnel 
deepens the divide. 
f. How to Manage and Share Data/Information within CA and between 
CA’s Partners  
The capabilities gaps in CIM, a CA core task, coupled with shortfalls in CIM 
systems, and poor interagency cooperation presented many challenges to effective 
management, analysis, and sharing of information with CA’s partners. 
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B. DISCUSSIONS 
During the course of the Discovery Phase, the authors and the design team 
conducted 21 discussions with stakeholders, non-CA and CA personnel. The two authors 
conducted nine initial discussions prior to the workshop and the workshop participants 
added twelve additional discussions with during the workshop. Figure 12 offers a 
breakdown of discussants during the workshop. 
 
Figure 12.  21 Stakeholders’ Discussions 
Using general questions as outlined in Chapter III, the design team created 
Empathy Maps for each discussant. Figure 13 illustrates a sample Empathy Map for a 
non-CA discussant, who is described as an intrinsically motivated public servant. The 
discussant talked about the following: 
 There is a disconnect between old and new generations 
 Leadership challenge due to lack of assessment/selection for older 
generation of senior leaders 
 Misrepresentation of CA at strategic level leads to misuse or 
underutilization of force 
 Senior leaders shape a narrative that does not reflect their teams 
capabilities 
 Misrepresentation by others 
 Negative experience with CA weighs heavily in minds 
 Mismanagement of personnel and inconsistent leadership 
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 CA has no voice excluded 
 Always have to differentiate between SOF and RC 
 Single training pipeline builds similarity within the force 
 No one knows about us; we do not know about each other  
In addition, the design team recorded the following observations of the 
discussant’s demeanor: 
 Rigid body language; sweat on forehead 
 Engaged 
 Held back when describing interactions and thoughts of RC 
From the above information, the design team inferred the following beliefs and 
thoughts that the discussant might have: 
 Personnel mismanagement and inconsistent leadership are detrimental to 
the force 
 There is a disconnect not only between CA orgs, but also between CA 
leadership and their own orgs 
 Things will improve when the new generation is in charge 
Furthermore, the design team inferred that the discussant might have the 
following feelings: 
 Anger at the loss of quality CA officers and NCOs 
 Concern about the misrepresentation of CA 
 Frustration about CA being marginalized 
Taken as a whole the Empathy Maps offer valuable insights to help the authors 
interpret the archival data. Problem Definition Phase of Design Thinking is presented in 
the next chapter to illustrate how the Empathy Maps produce Point of View Statements 
for discussants and how the Point of View Statements are merged with the archival data 
to generate and frame the major problems confronting the CA Regiment.  
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Figure 13.  Example of an Empathy Map  
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IV. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND IDEATION PHASES 
During the Problem Definition Phase, the design team followed three steps. First 
it created POV statements from the Empathy Maps for each discussant. POV statements 
synthesize the discussant’s verbal and non-verbal statements and the design team’s 
interpretations of them. Each POV statement then becomes one discussant’s views which 
provides rich details and stories from his/her perspective on CA’s problems. Second, 
integrating the archival data and the POV statements, the design team identified the major 
problem themes confronting CA. Last, the design team organized and prioritized the 
problem themes and framed them as four general problem areas.  
Upon completion of problem framing, the design team then turned to Ideation, the 
generation of new ideas to address the problems. Both Problem Definition and Ideation 
Phases and their results are presented in this chapter.  
A. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION: POV STATEMENTS  
1. POVs from Non-CA Personnel 
POV statements by non-CA personnel reveal that CA is important to the Army’s 
strategic mission, but CA needs to transform itself. The authors extracted for the 
following observations from the POV statements:  
 The CA Regiment is broken and needs to have a clear strategic message to 
explain its relevance 
 While CA is important and relevant to the current and future operational 
environments, maneuver commanders do not understand its roles and 
capabilities 
 SOF recognize the critical CA roles that can be expanded 
 There is a disconnect between the old and new generations of CA 
 The CA Regiment is fractured; senior CA leadership needs to unify the 
force 
 CA is a function and not a force 
 Instead of authority, CA needs to deliver legitimacy through engagement 
and capacity building 
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 Misrepresentation of CA at strategic level results in mismanagement and 
misemployment of the force 
 CA is a force multiplier that needs to market itself better 
 RC readiness is a problem due to problematic RC unit designations 
 CA is one of the most important functions in DOD 
 CA needs a benefactor with longevity, access and influence to advocate 
for the Regiment 
These observations drawn from the POVs underscore the point that the CA 
Regiment cannot do business as usual. These external stakeholders want the Regiment to 
develop its skills and forces, and communicate its value to all stakeholders. Interestingly 
enough, across the board, the stakeholders want CA to transform itself and indicate 
people are waiting either for the change to occur now, or for the next generation in the 
Regiment to take the reins. Although these stakeholders recognize CA’s strategic value, 
they are frustrated with the CA Regiment’ ability to adapt and change. Figure 14 
illustrates a sample of the POV statements from non-CA personnel.  
 
Figure 14.  Sample POV Statements from Non-CA Personnel 
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2. POVs from CA Personnel 
Discussions with CA personnel surfaced underlying frustration within the 
Regiment and ignited deep, strongly held beliefs and responses. There was general 
agreement that CA must address its problems to move forward. Such responses provided 
the design team with rich content, as illustrated in the following insights from the POVs:  
 Changing the frame of the problem from internal challenges to the CA 
branch’s strategic relevance will help focus the Regiment’s 
transformation.  
 Change will likely have to be directed externally (from OSD); the CA 
branch needs to shape the process through effective strategic 
communication. 
 CA can enhance its strategic relevance through better information sharing 
and integration with CF/SOF/UAPs. 
 The relationship between RC and AC has deteriorated and needs to be 
improved through inter-organization cooperation and personal links. 
 CA should have a common narrative to better inform JFCs and UAPs of 
its roles and capabilities. 
 There should be a single training standard for the both RC and AC, or 
different MOS to ensure proper certification of the force. 
 CA branding is necessary to enable consistencies in skill levels to meet 
and/or shape external stakeholders’ expectations. 
 Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (LREC) is a key distinguishing 
factor in the Regiment; language, cultural expertise and the ability to 
bridge networks are CA’s niche. 
 Innovative solutions require both the political power to implement such 
solutions and a consensus within the CA Regiment. 
 Oversold, uncertified functional specialties undermine CA’s credibility 
and can have negative long term strategic effects.  
 There need to be mechanisms to rid the branch of unqualified personnel. 
 CA personnel need SNA and network development training to be able to 
better understand how their efforts fit into the campaign plans. 
These insights suggest that the CA Regiment is in a state of crisis. Furthermore, 
the internal stakeholders recognize the challenges, but feel powerless to change the status 
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quo, and consequently rely on external stakeholders to be the catalysts for change. The 
members of the Regiment’s younger generation feel disenfranchised by the senior CA 
leadership; they are waiting for the leadership baton to pass to them. Alarmingly, the new 
generation reflects a sentiment that if something is not done soon, there will not be much 
of a CA branch left. Therefore, this CA 2025 capstone project carries a sense of urgency. 
Figure 15 illustrates a sample of CA Personnel POV statements. Appendix D contains a 
complete list of the 21 POV statements. 
 
Figure 15.  Sample POV Statements from CA Personnel 
B. ORGANIZED AND PRIORITIZED PROBLEM THEMES  
From the insights and perspectives gathered through archival record and POVs 
statements, the design team generated problem statements using post-it notes—one 
problem statement per post-it note as described in Chapter III. Then using affinity 
diagrams, design team members organized the individual problem statements into major 
problem themes:  
 59
 Branding: Use of symbols, strategic communication to improve the image 
and reputation of CA to internal and external stakeholders. 
 Strategic Messaging: Communication with external stakeholders to inform 
them on CA roles and capabilities. 
 Education: Undergraduate and graduate degrees, credentials. 
 Selection & Recruitment: The process to recruit, screen, select, and assess 
prospective CA personnel. 
 Training: Training pipelines, qualification courses, reclassification 
courses, advanced skills vs. core skills. 
 Force Structure: Departmentation of CA forces and implications on 
coordination, cooperation, overall readiness and organizational culture. 
 Talent Management: Human resource management to recruit, train, certify 
the right personnel with the right skills for the right jobs. 
 Information and Knowledge Management: The collection, processing, 
analysis, dissemination and sharing of civil information, lessons learned.  
 Culture: The set of norms, shared values and beliefs among the 
organizational members. 
 Career Management: Matching the right personnel who have the right 
skills with the right jobs, taking into consideration first the needs of the 
U.S. Army, then the welfare of the personnel and their families.  
 Generational Gap: Differences of outlook or opinion between people of 
different generation. 
 Money: Pay & benefit for personnel. 
 Metrics/Feedback: Mechanisms to measure performance, effectiveness, 
efficiency for a system to make corrective adjustments. 
 Benefactor: Someone in a position of authority or power who is willing to 
help the Regiment. 
C. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND PRIORITIZATION  
Based on a quick voting process described in Chapter III, the design team 
prioritized the problem themes and reduced them to four major areas: CA Identity; CA 
Strategic Messaging and Branding; CA Human Resource Management; and CA Force 
Structure.  
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1. Problem 1: Lack of Common CA Identity  
The design team identified CA’s core problem as a lack of a common identity. 
Considering the influential role organizational identity has in decision-making, sense-
making, influencing the organizational culture, and determining the organization’s brand, 
the design team concluded that four questions needed to be addressed to develop a 
common identity: Who are we? What do we do? How do we do it? Why do we do it?” 
(See Figure 6, Chapter II). 
2. Problem 2: Poor Strategic Messaging and Branding 
Inconsistencies in strategic messaging have resulted in systemic 
misunderstandings by decision makers of CA’s roles and capabilities. Given the broad 
range of CA functions and activities, both CA doctrine and unorchestrated strategic 
messaging efforts by CA personnel have fallen short in informing JFCs and UAPs what 
CA’s core competencies and value-added contributions are. The misunderstanding of 
CA’s roles and capabilities among JFCs and policy makers, who systematically lack 
experienced CA personnel on their staffs, has led to misemployment and mismanagement 
of CA forces.  
Furthermore, an organization’s brand or image vis-à-vis other organizations 
affects a member’s loyalty to his organization, his behaviors and relationships with other 
members, and ultimately the Regiment’s esprit de corps. Currently, CA personnel tend to 
“brand” themselves by the various tasks they perform, the organizations to which they are 
assigned, or the organizations that they support, resulting in potentially reducing overall 
Regiment cohesion.  
In addition, CA offers different stories and opinions about its history and lineage 
making it difficult to link the members’ past and present. Finally, symbols can be 
powerful and effective means in creating and reinforcing organizational brands. 
However, there are differing sentiments among the members of the CA Regiment as to 
whether the current Regimental and unit symbols (e.g., crests, patches) accurately or 
sufficiently represent its history and its identity. 
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3. Problem 3: Inconsistent Human Resource Management 
There are problems with CA recruitment and selection models that need to be 
examined to address the shortfalls not only of numbers but also the quality of CA 
personnel. The different training pipelines and selection processes—particularly between 
the AC and RC—remain significant challenges to the CA Regiment. In 2005, in an effort 
to recruit quality candidates for ARSOF, the U.S. Army Recruiting Command established 
the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB), which began recruiting active duty 
CA Officers and NCOs in 2007. Since the 2006 split between the RC and AC, 
USACAPOC(A) has conducted its own screening and recruitment for RC CA soldiers 
(Edwards, 2012, pp. 16–17). RC soldiers have the option to attend the 10-week CA 
Advanced Individual Training (AIT) after basic training to become CA soldiers. 
Otherwise, CA is a non-accession branch with no entry-level enlisted or officer 
opportunity (Storey, 2012, p. 8). Pre-deployment training for RC CA units—including 
those with provisional status after being redesignated from other MOS to meet the high 
CA demand during OIF—was previously provided by 1st Training Brigade whose 
personnel were primarily Infantry without operational CA experience (Malik, 2008, p. 
42). While the SORB continues to recruit active duty personnel for the 95th and 85th 
BDEs, USACAPOC(A) maintains a separate—and much less stringent—recruitment 
process for the RC personnel. Beginning in 2010, prospective CA recruits for the AC 
have had to undergo a 10-day CAAS during which their mental, physical and 
psychological aptitudes were tested in various scenarios to screen out those unfit for CA. 
No such selection process exists for RC personnel. 
The disparity in CA training between the AC (42-week residence course for both 
NCOs and officers) and the RC (29-day residence course, preceded by 6-month online 
training for RC officers; 4-week reclassification training for RC NCOs) results in 
different levels of MOS proficiency (Daniels & Foster, 2014, p. 20), and perpetuates the 
environment of separate communities within the branch (Little, 2013, p. 30). 
In addition, a lack of standardized baseline MOS skills not only impedes 
coordination, but also degrades interoperability between the AC and RC elements. 
Negative anecdotal experiences between the two components, or between one component 
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and the external stakeholders due to under-delivered technical CA skills, continue to 
deepen the divide along the AC/RC line and induce a culture of distrust. At a lesser 
degree, a similar divide emerges between the two active BDEs, since one supports 
ARSOF and the other GPF. 
Skillset mismatches in recruitment for RC functional specialists—those who have 
the functional specialty skills from their civilian jobs as lawyers, educators, police 
officers, firefighters, doctors, etc.—are also problematic, as Kimmey (2005) observes, 
“CA officers and NCOs are currently pressed into jobs they might know something 
about, but too often we expect a reservist who works for a bank to know how to set up a 
banking system” (p. 18). Another troubling trend is the claim oversold to the U.S. Army 
by USACAPOC(A) that since CA skills are so specialized, they can only be found in the 
RC, when in reality such skills remain lacking on functional specialty teams (Florig, 
2006; Edwards, 2012, p. 17). 
4. Problem 4: Capabilities Gaps in Analytical Skills and Lack of Unity in 
Force Structure 
As directed in JROCM 162-11, an analysis of the requirements for Civil Domain 
Analysts and CIM Network Architecture Specialists needs to be conducted. Analytical 
skills, such as SNA, Visual Analytics, and ARCGIS are critical capabilities gaps at the 
Team and Company levels. In addition, the current size of four personnel of a CAT 
impedes its operational autonomy, especially in a non-permissive environment where 
force protection requirements exceed its organic capacity in terms of number of personnel 
and vehicles. The dependency on others for augmented forces in order to operate 
perpetuates the support or “enabler” role of CA.  
Since the 2006 split, the 96th CA BN(A) has grown into the 95th CA BDE(A) 
which remains under USASOC. Another AC unit, the 85th CA BDE, was activated in 
2011 as a direct reporting unit to FORSCOM to support GPF under Army Structure 
Memorandum 10-15 (Walsh, 2013, p. 20). The split of U.S. Army CA forces, however, 
has had “unintended consequences” for CA as a branch, as widely observed by CA 
practitioners. Walsh (2013) contends, “A force designed to be interoperable, 
interdependent and mutually supportive is fractured along component, force designation 
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and Mission Command lines,” resulting in “… disruptive challenges affecting funding, 
equipping, training and education, and interoperability of the force” (p. 20). Similarly, 
Little (2013) postulates that the “operational territorialism” induced by competition over 
resources, especially when faced with new fiscal realities, degraded the unity of effort 
within the branch and reduced its overall capacity to support JFCs and UAPs (p. 29). 
Since the realignment of RC CA in 2006, Storey (2012) also observes an environment of 
distrust within the CA community along the AC/RC line as a hindrance to the 
cooperation between the two components (p. 15). 
D. IDEATION: SEARCHING FOR NEW IDEAS AS SOLUTIONS  
1. New Ideas for CA Identity  
The design team sub divided into three subgroups to brainstorm ideas in the 
search for new identify for CA. The team identified three criteria to guide their efforts: 
ideas should identify what is central or core to the organization; ideas should identify 
what is distinctive about the organization and what distinguishes it from others; and ideas 
should underscore what is enduring that enables the organization’s temporal continuity 
(Albert & Whetten, 1985, p. 265; Hatch & Schultz, 2000, p. 15; Whetten, 2006, p. 220).  
 
Figure 16.  Building Blocks of a CA Identity Statement 
Through the ideation process, the subgroups generated three identity statements. 
After briefing the different ideas each subgroup surfaced, the design team used a 
“fishbowl exercise”18 to synthesize the ideas into a single CA identity statement. This CA 
                                                 
18 A dynamic group setting where a small number of people in the center take part in the exercise 
while others stand outside, observe the process, and provide feedback as necessary. 
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identity statement, agreed upon by all design team members, is presented as a prototype 
in Chapter V.  
2. New Ideas for Strategic Redesign 
With an identity statement crafted that represented foundational understanding of 
CA and guidance for CA 2025, the next step was to brainstorm and ideate on the 
remaining three problem areas: CA Strategic Messaging and Branding; Human Resource 
Management; and Force Structure. Design team members moved into one of the three 
sub-groups based on their interest and expertise. To launch the brainstorming and 
ideation, sub groups asked “how might we questions.”  
a. How Might We Redesign Strategic Messaging and Branding for CA? 
Generated ideas about of strategic messaging: narratives to different stakeholders; 
functions, tasks, and skills; shaping options; effects; mission sets. 
 Generated ideas on a CA creed: Warrior Diplomat; ambiguous complex 
environment; the human domain. 
 Generated ideas on CA history: Thomas Jefferson’s Corps of Discovery; 
Lewis & Clark; James Beckwourth.  
 Generated ideas on CA symbols: gray beret; crossed tomahawks; unit and 
regimental insignia that would represent CA better. 
b. How Might We Redesign CA Human Resource Management? 
 Generated ideas on recruitment and selection: ROTC, OCS, MA as 
additional recruitment sources; 38X program; preparatory course pre-
CAAS; single vs. multiple pipelines for AC and RC. 
 Generated ideas on training: Single vs. multiple training pipelines; 
modular phases; ARSOF CCC; additional skills in negotiation, planning, 
and analysis; lengths of training; funding sources and implications. 
 Generated ideas on professionalization of CA: branch vs. specialty branch 
vs. functional area; civilian credentials; CA board; CA curricula; 
command vs. admin tracks. 
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c. How Might We Redesign CA Force Structure?  
 Generated ideas on team/company composition: six- or eight-person 
CATs; operational autonomy; gaps in analytical skills; CA warrant officer 
program. 
 Generated ideas on a unified command: multi-component at BN vs. BDE 
levels; USASOC/1st SFC(A)/FORSCOM as parent organization; cross-
training between RC & AC; regional alignment; crossing of P11 and P2 
funding; components to fill command/staff billets; losses of one-star 
billets; increased coordination, efficiency and effectiveness.  
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V. PROTOTYPING PHASE 
A. PROTOTYPE 1: CA IDENTITY STATEMENT 
The prototyping process surfaced different concepts and language the design team 
wanted to include in the design statement. For example, CA tagline variations included 
“Masters of the Human Domain” and “Elites in the Civ-Mil Domain, etc. Despite the 
variations, building on the four main components of CA’s identity—who we are, what we 
do, how we do it, and why—the design team unanimously accepted the CA identity 
statement shown in Figure 17.  
 
Figure 17.  Prototype 1: CA Identity Statement 
B. PROTOTYPE 2: STRATEGIC MESSAGING AND BRANDING 
The rich discussions around strategic messaging and branded yielded two main 
distinct prototypes: strategic messaging and branding. Additionally, based on the ideation 
and brainstorming around branding, the subgroup decided to create three different 
prototypes for branding: CA creed; CA historical roots; and CA symbols.  
1. Prototype 2a Strategic Messaging 
Given the persistent insufficient understanding of CA roles and capabilities 
among decision makers—JFCs, UAPs and relevant stakeholders—the design team 
developed a prototyped solution in strategic messaging to address this knowledge gap. 
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This strategic message can be delivered as an elevator speech or an in-depth discussion 
with stakeholders. The intention of this messaging is for the all members of the CA 
Regiment to speak with one voice and stay on message at all levels. The three messaging 
areas in Figure 18 highlight why CA is important, how CA can shape the environment, 
and the methods by which CA achieves its mission. Embracing these identity and 
capability features will be critical in meeting the challenges of the future operational 
environments, supporting the 7th WfF, enhancing the U.S. Army’s capabilities to operate 
in the human domain, and ultimately supporting the Army 2025 Vision. 
Improving the external stakeholders’ understanding of CA’s values is an 
important part of strategic messaging. Outlining what CA brings to the fight at the 
different levels—CA Soldier/Warrior Diplomat, CA Team/Company, and CA BN/ 
BDE—enables the stakeholders to conceptualize and understand CA’s knowledge, skills, 
attributes, and capabilities. With this understanding, stakeholders then will be able to 
employ CA forces more effectively to achieve the desired end states. The fact is, at the 
unit of action levels—Team and Company—CA has enjoyed tactical success that can be 
built upon to expand the scope of operational autonomy in the future. However, 
connecting tactical success to operational and strategic objectives has been problematic 
for CA. Concerted efforts in strategic messaging at all three levels from tactical to 
strategic to articulating CA’s roles, capabilities and functions are, therefore, crucial in 




Figure 18.  Prototype 2a: Strategic Messaging 
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2. Prototype 2b Branding; CA Creed  
As noted in Chapter IV, CA currently does not have a creed that inspires its 
Soldiers. However, it was hoped that in addition to its aspirational values, a CA creed 
would evoke encourage Regimental beliefs, standards, principles, and aims needed for 
2025. The CA creed, as shown in Figure 19, is designed to be simple, and yet powerful 
enough that every CA Soldier could memorize it and refer to it throughout his career and 
rely on it in difficult times. This call to arms speaks to both the internal and external 
audience of the CA Regiment. Internally, it implores CA soldiers to always strive to 
maintain a high state of readiness, especially given CA’s deployment rates, the highest in 
the U.S. Army in the last decade, are likely to continue into the future. Internally, the 
creed signals to those who cannot maintain these standards that this CA may be not for 
them. To an external audience, the CA creed can be a recruiting tool to attract the right 
personnel for the CA mission, as well as an assessment guideline for the best-qualified 
recruits. The statement, “I accomplish my mission anytime, anywhere, and under any 
conditions” requires mental, physical, and emotional toughness, whereas “adapting and 
thriving in ambiguous environments” demands adaptive, mature critical thinkers in the 
Regiment’s ranks. Lastly, to the external stakeholders, and to the Nation, the CA creed 
signifies a long-term commitment. 
 
Figure 19.  Prototype 2b Branding; CA Creed 
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3. Prototype 2c Branding; CA Historical Roots 
CA’s rich history is more expansive than has been captured and represented to 
date. Currently, General Winfield Scott is regarded as the Father of CA, yet CA offers 
much more than the Military Governance (MG) capability historically traced to Scott. 
The design team offered a different perspective beyond General Winfield Scott’s 
contributions. President Thomas Jefferson could be the Father of CA for his 
establishment of the Corps of Discovery to conduct CA-type activities. In addition, the 
design team highlighted three distinctive cases—Lewis and Clark, James Beckwourth 
and General Winfield Scott—to represent the breath and width of CA. Lewis, Clark and 
Beckwourth were specially selected, trained, linguistically and culturally astute civil 
scouts who effectively engaged the local populace; Scott successfully conducted MG. 
a. Thomas Jefferson and the Corps of Discovery 
In 1803, President Thomas Jefferson commissioned the first U.S. expedition to the 
Pacific coast in order to explore the territory, make contact with indigenous nations and deny 
territorial claim to European powers through the projection of military and diplomatic force 
(Mullin, 2007). President Jefferson understood that the most effective way to establish 
legitimacy in this new territory was to build relationships with the inhabitants while mapping 
the physical and civil environment. The expedition was comprised of specially selected 
soldiers chosen from a pool of volunteers. CPT Meriwether Lewis and LT William Clark led 
the expedition, which became known as the Corps of Discovery. The team’s core was 
comprised of 11 men, but expanded to 30 men, including officers, NCOs and enlisted 
soldiers, all coming from a variety of military and civilian backgrounds. Their common 
thread consisted of firmness of character, intellect, and skills as a frontiersman (Ambrose, 
1996). The two-year expedition pushed the limits of adaptability and ingenuity, but through 
diplomacy and military prowess, Lewis and Clark established contact with numerous 
indigenous tribes, made countless scientific discoveries, and deterred Spanish invasion into 
U.S. territory. The highly skilled soldiers of the Corps of Discovery embodied the spirit of 
the CA Regiment. By mastering the civil environment, these soldiers became the eyes and 
ears of the nation. Their discoveries and the relationships they built informed U.S. policy and 
shaped the growth of the country.  
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According to Ambrose (1996), CPT Meriwether Lewis was chosen by President 
Jefferson to lead the expedition because  
It was impossible to find a character who to a compleat science in botany, 
natural history, mineralogy & astronomy, joined the firmness of 
constitution & character, prudence, habits adapted to the woods & a 
familiarity with the Indian manners and character, requisite for this 
undertaking. (p. 76) 
Thus, Jefferson proceeded to arrange for a year of specific scientific training for 
Lewis from some of the best-known scientists in the United States so that he would be 
equipped for some of the most academic challenges of the expeditions. His intent was for 
Lewis to carry the message that the tribes living in the Northwest had a new leader and 
for Lewis to highlight the technology of the time, while adding to the collective body of 
scientific knowledge. 
b. James Beckwourth  
James Beckwourth served as an Indian Scout, a guide, a frontiersman, and a 
mountain man in the early 19th century (Field, 2003). As a scout, he assisted the U.S. 
Army’s westward expansion. As a guide, he discovered Beckwourth Pass facilitating the 
safe passage of civilians into California (Noy, 1999, p. 56). As a cultural expert, he 
negotiated treaties that ensured safe passage between the U.S. Army and various Native 
American tribes. Because of his cultural sensitivity and knowledge of his environment, he 
was uniquely suited to negotiate the civil and physical terrain associated with westward 
expansion. As a man born into slavery of mixed African-American and Caucasian 
ancestry, Beckwourth was later admitted into the Crow tribe (Gregson, 2005). His 
prowess on the battlefield and ability to understand the language and culture of the Crow 
earned him such respect that he was accepted within the tribe and elevated to chief. He 
spent his entire life bridging gaps between different ethnicities and cultures while 
reconciling various points of view.  
c. General Winfield Scott 
General Winfield Scott successfully conducted MG in Mexico in the 1840s. 
However, he was also in command of Indian removal at the execution of the Indian 
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Removal Act 10 years prior, commonly known as the Trail of Tears. The current CA 
brand suggests that CA’s founding father was directly responsible for carrying out the 
most horrific population resource control activities conducted by the U.S. Army. See 
Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20.  Prototype 2c Branding; CA History 
4. Prototype 2d Branding; Unifying Symbols 
a. Gray Beret 
Support for the gray beret was surprisingly unanimous among the design team 
members. The gray beret would distinguish the CA Regiment from support personnel in 
the U.S. Army who would wear the traditional maroon beret or no beret at all. There 
already exists a proposed set of flashes that could be adopted, but the color gray is 
significant in that it represents CA’s ability to operate in the “gray area,” or CA’s 
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ambiguous and complex operational environments. In addition, the gray symbolizes the 
illumination of the dark spaces—unknown networks, ungoverned spaces, etc.—for 
military commanders conducting operations where the parameters of the mission may not 
be clearly defined. The team recommended the beret, only be awarded as an individual 
headgear following the completion of the CAQC, and not as a unit headgear, to 
symbolize the individual soldier’s qualification as a CA professional. 
b. Shoulder Sleeve Insignia 
Interestingly, the thirst for such a change is so strong within the CA Regiment that 
this insignia was produced long before the Design Thinking workshop. It is a prototyped 
solution to better represent who the members of the CA Regiment are and who they want 
to be.  
 The Airborne Tab represents the airborne capability and status of the unit.  
 The Shield symbolizes the Unit’s charter to protect and defend U.S. 
National interests abroad, and defend the civil populace of developing 
nations in war-torn countries in that populace’s darkest moments. The 
shield traces its lineage to the original 1st Special Operations Command, 
which later led to the design of the USACAPOC shoulder insignia. 
 USASOC Arrowhead serves as the backdrop of the unit patch and 
signifies the regiment’s long-standing heritage and traditions with the U.S. 
Army Special Operations Forces.  
 The Quill represents the Civil Affairs core task of bringing order and 
Governance to Nations crippled by war, conflict, and disaster.  
 The Three Lightning Bolts represent Civil Affairs operations conducted on 
Land, at Sea (littoral), and from the Air (Airborne) in any environment in 
the world; they also commemorate the three campaign awards for the 
Unit’s service in Korea. The gold color of the lightning bolts denotes 
excellence.  
 The V-42 Fairbairn-Sykes Dagger is symbolic of all Army Special 
Operations Forces, represents the lineage of Civil Affairs activities in SOF 
environments—permissive, semi-permissive, and non-permissive—across 
the globe, and denotes strength and honor.  
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c. Crossed Peace Pipe Tomahawks for Branch Insignia and on Regimental 
Distinctive Insignia 
The consensus among the design team members was that the frontiersman better 
represents and embodies the spirit of future CA soldiers, and that the crossed tomahawks 
are a physical representation of that spirit. Tomahawks were a ubiquitous item from the 
early frontier history of America. Frontiersmen and Native Americans used tomahawks 
alike, and they originally came from English boarding axes that were used for trade. The 
tomahawk was a multifaceted item just as CA Soldiers are multi-capable soldiers. 
Specifically the pipe tomahawks were used as currency on the frontier as trade items and 
regarded as highly valued tools and commodities. The pipe tomahawk has a pipe bowl on 
one end, making it useful as a peace pipe; this represents CA’s ability to engage in 
diplomacy. The sharp edge represents CA’s ability as a tool to shape their environment, or 
when needed, perform as a weapon.  
The idea of the pipe tomahawk as a symbol came from a former Special 
Operations Command (Forward) (SOC-FWD) commander who felt his efforts were 
failing because the military operated like hunters trying to chase down their prey. He 
believed that the frontiersman and the mountain man offered better methods. They were 
able to use their knowledge of the terrain to analyze and decide where their prey might be 
and to prepare themselves to catch that prey. He directed CA personnel to try to analyze 
the civil environment in a similar manner, to predict where problems might arise and 
develop solutions and effective responses before a crisis occurred. 
d. Regimental Crest  
For coherence among the new symbols, the design team replaced the former 
sword and scroll with the crossed peace pipe tomahawks. In addition, the design kept the 
torch due to its representation of illuminating the dark spaces where CA operates. All 
symbols are displayed in Figure 21.  
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Figure 21.  Prototype 2d Branding; Unifying Symbols for the CA Regiment 
C. HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
Ideation for Human Resource Management (HRM) solutions yielded many new 
ideas as noted in Chapter IV. The subgroup on HRM, decided to create three prototypes 
to capture these idea: 3a Recruitment and Selection; 3b Training; and 3c 
Professionalization of CA.  
1. Prototype 3a HRM; Recruitment and Selection 
a. Officer Recruitment and Selection 
In addition to a branch transfer, which is currently the only way for an officer to 
be accessed into CA, the design team examined commissioning sources—Officer 
Candidate School (OCS), Reserve Officer Training Course (ROTC), United States 
Military Academy (USMA)—as other possible accession opportunities for expanding 
recruitment. For this accession path from commissioning sources, personnel request entry 
into CA as 1LT/O-2. This path has an optional preparatory course designed to help 
prospective CA officers gain the required skills to successfully complete CAAS. Upon 
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successful completion of CAAS, individuals can pursue one of two routes: (1) they can 
be branch detailed to an Operations branch and transition to CA at the CPT rank, or (2) 
they can continue on to graduate school. The graduate school option entails a degree that 
CA pays for and is aligned with its desired skills. During graduate school, individuals 
must also serve in a RC unit to gain the necessary foundational skills prior to the CAQC. 
Common in both paths are airborne school, ARSOF Captains Career Course (CCC), and 
CA unit integration. Another notable change from the existing training pipeline is the 
completion of ARSOF CCC after the CAQC for AC personnel; the RC officers follow a 
different model. 
Summary of the proposed changes (Figure 22, left side): 
 Additional recruitment sources: ROTC, OCS, USMA 
 Introduction of a preparatory course to prepare prospective CA recruits for 
CAAS 
 Addition of Graduate school/Branch detail paths 
 ARSOF CCC as a requirement after CAQC 
b. Enlisted Recruitment and Selection (38X) 
This prototype explored another recruitment path for enlisted personnel, called the 
38X program, which is similar to the 18X program. This program aims to recruit college 
graduates who meet entrance requirements and want to enlist. Their path consists of basic 
training, airborne school, an optional CA preparatory course, CAAS, CAQC, and CA unit 
integration. The 38X prototype intends to increase the number in enlisted ranks with 
educated and mature personnel who are fit for CA. 
Summary of the proposed changes (Figure 22, right side): 
 Introduction of the 38X program to recruit college graduates for the 
enlisted ranks 
 Introduction of a CA preparatory course to prepare prospective CA 
recruits for CAAS 
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Figure 22.  Prototype 3a: CA Recruitment & Selection 
2. Prototype 3b HRM; Training 
Currently, due to the different paths available to those seeking to become CA (See 
Figure 11, Current Force Structure), CA is not producing the same baseline level of skills 
across the force, which has proven problematic. In Prototype 3b (Figure 23), baseline 
skills levels will be standardized across the components through a single selection and 
training pipeline to improve the value of the CA brand. Under this training model, RC 
personnel will go through the same qualification for the same amount of time as their AC 
counterparts. This four-phase training pipeline is designed to be completed either 
continuously or by modules. For example, if a RC soldier can allocate the time to attend 
the entire course, he will go straight through. On the other hand, if time does not permit, 
he will have two years to successfully complete all four phases and be awarded the MOS. 
In the event the individual does not complete it successfully within the given two-year 
period, he will have start over from the beginning. The assumption is, for an elite force, 
the committed recruits will make the time to complete the course.  
In the training model prototype, the Civil Affairs Qualification Course (CAQC) 
includes (but is not limited to) the following modules: 
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 Language and cultural immersion (LREC) 
 Civil Affairs core instruction (CR, NA, UW planning) 
 Civil Information and Network analysis 
 Negotiations 
 FHA planning 
 Human Performance and dynamics 
 Operation Sluss-Tiller (OST) (Culminating Exercise) 
Standardization will produce a common core of skills and provide a common 
experience. A common set of skills will reinforce the CA value. Currently, CA is the only 
branch with different standards between its RC and AC components, and yet its Soldiers 
are awarded the same MOS. Furthermore, the socialization and indoctrination process 
fostered through the common bonding experiences of training can help develop the 
individual-level bonds of trust and respect essential to improving the organizational 
culture in the Regiment. 
 
Figure 23.  Prototype 3b: CA Training 
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3. Prototype 3c HRM; Professionalization of CA 
Due the complexities and nuances inherent in human-centered affairs, CA 
practitioners frequently encounter unexpected situations and novel events. Therefore, the 
conduct of CAO requires critical analysis, reinforced with adaptive thinking by CA 
practitioners who are given more autonomy to devise innovative solutions that fit the 
environment. A descriptive comparison between a Branch and a Corps as shown in Figure 
24 suggests that a Corps model is a better fit for CA. Following a Corps model, CA’s 
civilian roots will also aid in its professionalization.  
Prototype 3 HRM, Professionalization of CA entails the concept of creating the 
system to professionalize CA. CA meets the definition of professional work as far as it 
requires daily application of human judgment, application of theory to practice, etc. 
Typically, at minimum, the structure of a profession consists of a credentialing body to 
control entry, manage certification/licensure, monitor the conduct and merit of the 
practitioners, and maintain and disseminate the body of knowledge. Once it becomes a 
professional Corps, CA would interface with the U.S. Army in similar manner as other 
Corps, such as the Nurse Corps and Vet Corps. Figure 25 portrays the central role of the 
credentialing body—the CA Board, chaired by the CA commandant—in the career tracks 
for CA professionals. As a Civil-Military profession inherently has both Civil and 
Military aspects, members of the profession will be required to have a minimum amount 
of military experience, as well a minimum amount of civilian experience. Civilian 
credentials for CA professionals will come from undergraduate and graduate degrees in 
Civil Affairs and other disciplines related to the CA functional specialty areas (Figure 7). 
The Civil Affairs curricula will need to be jointly developed by CA proponency and 
civilian universities. In addition to professionalizing CA forces, the processes that 
members go through in recruitment, selection, indoctrination, and socialization need to be 
established to forge a strong organizational identity and esprit de corps.  
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Figure 24.  Descriptive comparison between Branch and Corps 
 
Figure 25.  Prototype 3c HRM; CA Professionalization Map 
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D. FORCE STRUCTURE 
The subgroup on Force Structure generated two prototypes: 4a. Team/Company 
Composition; and 4b Unified Command.  
1. Prototype 4a Force Structure; Team/Company Composition 
As seen in Figure 26, the team/company prototype calls for an increase of the 
current team size by two personnel to address the problems of both analytical skills and 
operational autonomy. Such increase includes two 38Bs, one of whom with an F 
Additional Skill Identifier (ASI). This new ASI indicates completion of the Special 
Warfare Advanced Analysis and Targeting Course (SWAATC). Additionally, with its 
organic capacity increased to six, a CAT can potentially man two or more vehicles, which 
will lessen or alleviate its dependence on adjacent units for augmented manpower to meet 
force protection requirements to operate especially in semi- and non-permissive 
environments. Furthermore, at the CA company level, the CMOC will receive an 
additional 38B with an F ASI, and a CA warrant officer (380A). This 380A would 
replace the current CMOC deputy (38A O-3).  
In the future, team size can be further expanded to eight, with the additions of a 
medic and a warrant officer. The increased team size will further improve the team’s 
operational autonomy and the prospect of “owning” battle space.  
This prototype also call for a CA Warrant Officer (WO) program that currently 
does not exist. A CA WO, as a technical expert, is expected to provide advanced 
analytical, mapping capabilities and working knowledge of Army information systems 
that enable information dissemination and sharing with JFCs and UAPs. A model for 




Figure 26.  Prototype 4a Force Structure; CA Team/Company Composition 
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Figure 27.  CA WO Life Cycle Mode 
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2. Prototype 4b Force Structure; Unified Command 
The current CA force structure—95th, 85th and USACAPOC(A) under three 
distinct chains of command—has contributed to degraded coordination between the three. 
Informal, or ad hoc communication, has been sporadic and heavily hamstrung by 
conflicting personalities and bureaucratic institutional constraints.  
The restructuring will remove five one-star commands and one two-star 
command. This move is necessary to increase operational efficiency, enhance 
coordination, enforce common standards, flatten the organization, and remove 
bureaucratic roadblock. The headquarters will have the ability to reach down to any CA 
element for any operation as needed so that the force can go anywhere, anytime, under 
any conditions with minimal delay.  
Within command elements, key billets, such as S-3, XO, and command teams 
would be dual-billet slots (AGR or AC). The CACOM would be a deployable element. 
Since the BDEs will be geographically aligned, units can be tasked to support ASCCs or 
TSOCs. JTF under SOCCOM will have special selection and recruitment to fill special 
missions. Special qualifications would be addressed by identifying one AC and one RC 
BN per BDE as airborne units in order to maintain airborne capability. 
Option 1 (Figure 28) integrates multi-component personnel to the BDE level with 
three RC BNs and two AC BNs in each BDE. This option provides unified administrative 
functions at BDE and provides a quicker response to BN-size mission sets. 
Geographically aligned BDEs will be able to facilitate missions between AC and RC 
BNs. Concerns include maintaining the status quo for reserve readiness (culture, 





Figure 28.  Prototype 4b Force Structure; Unified Multi-Component Command 
(Option 1) 
Option 2 (Figure 29) adds multi-component personnel to the BN level with 
homogenous, integrated (AC/RC) COs as shown in Figure 28. This option provides 
uniformity of training and standards all the way to the CO level, increases the RC/AC 
interface of leadership and operations, and allows for mission sets to be managed and 
rotated between RC and AC at the BN level. However, inherent in this option are the 
challenges of managing administrative issues (e.g., evaluation, promotions, training, 
funding, finance) for both the AC and RC at the BN level. In addition, the availability of 
RC personnel to manage administrative systems at the BN level is a concern. 
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VI. TESTING PHASE 
This chapter outlines the iterative and interactive process the design team 
followed to generate feedback on the prototypes. Feedback falls into three different 
waves. The first wave of testing occurred when peer sub-groups shared their low-
resolution prototypes with other sub-groups. The next wave of testing came from 
discussants who had participated in the discovery phase during the NPS workshop. The 
authors and other members of the design team subsequently presented the prototypes to 
three groups in Fort Bragg—senior-level leaders, BN/CO-level leaders, and CAT-level 
leaders—to generate additional feedback from the force. To systematically capture the 
feedback during the Test phase, the design team members used quad-charts with four 
areas:  
 What worked  
 What could be improved 
 Questions 
 Ideas  
Throughout this chapter, the sample feedback is presented in quad-charts with the 
corresponding prototype numbers to illustrate the evolution of the prototypes over time. 
Appendix E contains a number of refined prototypes, based on the feedback received 
during the Testing Phase. 
A. FEEDBACK AMONG DESIGN TEAM SUB-GROUPS 
The first level of feedback was from within the sub-groups. Given their diverse 
backgrounds, the members in each of the three sub-groups collaborated on various 
prototypes, giving one another feedback while overcoming their own biases. The 
seasoned workshop facilitators guided the sub-groups through this process to develop 
fluency while ensuring forward progress. See Tables 4–7. 
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1. Feedback on Identity Prototype  
The design team collaborated on the identity statement with its members giving 
one another feedback throughout the process. 










2. Strategic Messaging and Branding 
The Strategic Messaging and Branding sub-group (Table 5) received a great deal 
of feedback generated by these prototypes.  
















3. Human Resource Management 
Latent frustrations surfaced when the authors collected feedback on the Human 
Resource Management prototypes (Table 6), indicative of a problem area that requires 
serious examination for the CA Regiment.  
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4. Force Structure 
Among the different prototypes under Force Structure (Table 7), the unified 
multi-component command concept was recognized by the design team members as 
likely to be the most contentious topic. However, they also recognized the need for 
optimized departmentation that would improve coordination, division of labor, and 
ultimately the overall readiness of the CA Regiment. 









B. FEEDBACK FROM DESIGN WORKSHOP DISCUSSANTS 
1. Feedback from Senior-Level Officer with a Strategic Perspective 
As an influential voice of an external stakeholder with a strategic perspective, a 
senior-level officer who provides candid feedback has input that merits attention (Table 
8). He recognizes the strategic value of CA, especially its critical role in influencing the 
relevant populations across the range of military operations. He also recognizes the 
generational gap that up-and-coming CA leaders will need to bridge and overcome in 
order to further the Regiment. 
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2. Other Feedback from NPS Design Workshop Discussants 
The feedback from a mix of CA and non-CA, military and civilian personnel with 
whom the design team previously engaged during the Discovery Phase provided the last 
round of input for prototype refinement during the four-day Design Thinking workshop at 
NPS. It is important to note that the CA identity statement appeared to resonate the most 
with all discussants, especially the members of the Regiment. See Tables 9–12. 
a. Identity  
Table 9 shows the feedback from the NPS discussants to the Identity prototypes. 








b. Strategic Messaging and Branding 
Table 10 shows the feedback from the NPS discussants to the Strategic Messaging 
and Branding prototypes. 


















c. Human Resource Management 
 Table 11 shows the feedback from the NPS discussants to the Human Resource 
Management prototypes. 











d. Force Structure 














C. FEEDBACK FROM THE CA REGIMENT 
To reach the widest audience, the authors chose Fort Bragg, NC—the home 
station for the majority of the participating organizations: 1st SWTG(A), 95th CA 
BDE(A), USACAPOC(A), IMSG—as the location for the feedback sessions with the 
Regimental members. VTC and regular phone conference capabilities also enabled 
personnel from the outstations to dial in during or after the feedback sessions to provide 
their feedback. 
1. Senior-Level Leaders 
Overall, the senior-level leaders expressed their overwhelming support of this 
capstone, as all recognized the many ongoing challenges facing the Regiment (Table 13). 
The feedback session in Fort Bragg, NC also served as a forum for senior leadership of 
the different organizations to share their opinions, ideas, and perspectives on the relevant 
topics of discussion.  












The CA identity statement received positive feedback from senior leadership 
(Table 14). Further refinement of the tagline was encouraged, with some differing 
opinions over the balance of “Who we are” vs. “Who we need to be in 2025” to be 
reflected in the statement. In addition, there are some concerns of potential confusions or 
ambiguities over the concept of Human Domain yet to be officially adopted in doctrine.  













b. Strategic Messaging and Branding 
One salient question arose in the discussion among senior leaders on strategic 
messaging, “Do RC and AC need/have the same capabilities?” (Table 15). In doctrine, 
both components share many functions and capabilities, with the exception of LREC 
capability only maintained in the AC, and functional specialty cells only existing in the 
RC (FM 3-24, 2014, pp. 2-1–2-31). Many senior leaders asserted that the roles of CA in 
Phase-0 and UW need to be expanded and highlighted, given the contemporary and 
future global security environments. Others urged the group to focus on the needs of the 
Army and the Nation in designing CA for 2025, a point well received by the authors as it 
resonates with the purpose of this capstone. 
The CA creed received unanimous support from the senior leadership, indicating 
a latent need of the Regiment. Similarly, the revised CA’s history proposed by the design 
team—with the introduction of Thomas Jefferson, Lewis & Clark, James Beckwourth—
received broad support from the group. 
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c. Human Resource Management 
The discussion on one vs. multiple training standards was relatively muted. A few 
senior leaders contended that having one training standard is necessary to improve the 
quality within the Regiment. Others raised the same question, “Do RC and AC need the 
same skills levels?” and suggested a lower baseline level of skills for the RC (Table 16).  




















d. Force Structure 
While improved coordination was an attractive characteristic, the losses of one-
star billets under the proposed unified command structure were raised as significant 
impediments to CA engagement at the GCC level. The crossing of P2 and P11 funding in 
a multi-component command would be another significant challenge requiring detailed 
feasibility analysis. The idea of bringing CA back under USASOC was mentioned as a 
potential solution. In addition, senior leaders appeared very receptive to the idea of the 
Warrant Officer program, though some shared the concern about potential depletion of 
the senior NCO ranks as a result (Table 17). 

















2. Battalion- and Company-level Leaders 
Much like the senior-level group, BN/CO-level leaders were enthusiastic about the 
collaborative efforts by the Regiment as they also recognized its challenges. By design, the 
focus for BN/CO-level discussion shifted more toward the operational level (Table 18). 
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Even though the leaders from this group agreed on the necessity for a common 
CA identity statement, there were varying ideas on the tag line, or the title (Table 19). 
Some apprehension with claiming titles, such as “Master” or “Expert” originated from 
the underlying perceived trend of CA over-promising but under-delivering by external 
stakeholders. Some leaders proposed that CA personnel improve its capabilities first 
before claiming mastery or expertise, while others recognized the aspirational aspect of 
the identity statement, i.e., what the Regiment needs to be in 2025.  











b. Strategic Messaging and Branding 
The CA creed generated a lot of positive feedback and received overwhelming 
support from almost the entire group. The BN/CO-level leaders also expressed support 
for the revised history of CA and wanted to see it developed further. Additionally, the 
branding symbols e.g., crossed tomahawks and the proposed unit patch received 
favorable response from the group, with some leaders contending that the proposed 
symbols better represent the Regiment (Table 20). 















c. Human Resource Management 
Having one training standard was one of the dominant topics of discussion as the 
link between skills levels and operational/tactical successes was more readily observed 
by the BN/CO-level leaders (Table 21). Many recognized the need for professionalization 
of the force and advocated for more options for CA personnel to pursue undergraduate 
and graduate degrees. Some, however, found the CA professionalization prototype too 
complex for implementation, since it clearly required much more detailed feasibility 
analysis. The idea of expanding recruitment to ROTC received positive feedback, 
whereas there was more apprehension about the 38X program due to the potentially lack 
of experience and maturity of X personnel. 
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d. Force Structure 
The struggle to increase CA’s operational autonomy, as experienced or observed 
by the BN/CO-level leaders, manifested in the broad support for the prototyped solution 
to increase CAT size to 8, as well as the concept of scalable C2 in joint environment 
(Table 22). Some expressed concern, however, that 8-person size might be too large and 
consequently reduce the overall number of units of action. 
The proposed Warrant Officer program received very positive feedback. It is 
important to note that there was another ongoing effort in the Regiment to advocate for a 
CA Warrant Officer program, as it was revealed to the authors during the feedback 
session. Recognizing the critical gaps in technical expertise, institutional knowledge, and 
operational-level planning during rapid expansion of the CA Regiment, Matelski, Grez 
and Ludwick (2015) propose, in their concept paper titled Bridging the Technical 
Capabilities Gap: CA Warrant Officers, the implementation of a CA Warrant Officer 
program in order to “adequately retain and invest in the experience and education of [CA] 
Soldier” (pp. 2–3). 
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3. Team-level leaders 
The CAT-level leaders displayed an encouraging level of enthusiasm during the 
feedback session (Table 23). Candid discussions demonstrated the strong drive in the younger 
generation to be proactive in meeting the Regiment’s ongoing challenges. They welcomed 
dialogue and discussions to discuss the future of the Regiment. As they also recognized the 
many challenges facing the Regiment, there was a clear desire for change. A question from the 
group, voiced a few times, was “Will senior leadership listen to what we have to say?”  
















As one of the CAT-level leaders correctly observed, the CA identity statement 
speaks to both internal and external stakeholders (Table 24). The concern about the 
Human Domain not yet defined/adopted in doctrine also was raised in this group, 
potentially leading to ambiguities to external stakeholders who might have different 
conceptual understanding of such term.  











b. Strategic Messaging and Branding 
The branding symbols appeared to resonate the most with the younger generation. 
A leader shared with the group that based on his past literature review on symbolism, hats 
are the most noticeable symbols; the gray beret therefore will be a powerful symbol to 
implement for branding. Other branding symbols also received very positive feedback 
from the group (Table 24).  
However, some members of the group cautioned that the proposal for the new 
head gear would need to be framed carefully to avoid being misconstrued as CA’s desire 
to be “special” or SF-like. 
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c. Human Resource Management 
In addition to voicing their opinions regarding the necessity for the one training 
pipeline in order to standardize baseline skill levels, the CAT-level leaders also 
recognized that the Regiment needs to improve its existing core competencies, to include 
the functional specialties, in order to maintain an edge over the competition (e.g., HTS). 
The CA professionalization prototype also generated a lot of interests, at the same time 
drew criticisms for its complexity and potential high costs.  
Compared to the two previous, more senior groups, the feedback from the CAT-
level leaders to the 38X was significantly more negative (Table 26). Lack of maturity and 
Army experience were cited as the primary reasons, however in a much more emotionally 
charged manner, since these leaders would be the first ones dealing with such potential 
problems. They maintained the position that the costs of the 38X program would 
outweigh its benefits.  
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d. Force Structure 
There was a strong desire in the “younger generation” present during the feedback 
session to unify the Regiment, under USASOC or FORSCOM (Table 27). Many 
understood that a predicate for the unified multi-component force structure prototype 
would be one training standard. Some were skeptical about the benefits of cross-training 
between the RC and AC companies, with the exception of annual training, since RC 
trains on the weekends whereas AC mostly trains on week days. 
The team composition prototype generated significant feedback. The proposed 
increase in team size, advised by a few in the audience, needs to take into consideration 
the systemic shortages in medic-qualified personnel (68Y, 38BW4). Others cautioned 
about using F as the ASI for the analyst, since it may be misconstrued for HUMINT 
analysts on SF teams. One potential solution, as ideated by the group, is to fill that 
capabilities gap with 35B personnel.  
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VII. RECOMMENDED NEXT STEPS AND FINAL THOUGHTS  
This is a golden opportunity. Don’t worry about hurt feelings and our 
past. Focus on our community and its future. 
—A senior CA leader 
 
This chapter offers a roadmap for the strategic design of CA in 2025, a plan for 
managing group prototypes, a recommended pathway of implementation through the 
Regimental Council, and future Design Thinking workshops to refine CA’s 2025 
strategic design. Implementation of these efforts requires dedicated and sustained 
leadership in CA and the Army system in which CA is embedded. The chapter ends with 
the authors’ thoughts and recommendations about Design Thinking and CA 2025.  
A. PROPOSED ROADMAP 
The proposed roadmap in Figure 30 for the strategic design of CA recommends 
an order of prototype implementation with accompanying leadership (shown in blue) 
needed to facilitate the process. The prototypes are organized under four groups: Identity, 
Strategic Messaging and Branding, Human Resource Management, and Force Structure. 
The prototypes emerged from problem identification and ideation in Chapter IV, low-
resolution concepts and ideas in Chapter V, and were tested and refined in Chapter VI. 
These prototypes are the tangible results of this capstone project. The design team 
recommends an order of their implementation so each prototype can build on the 
foundation of the others one step at a time.  
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Figure 30.  CA 2025 Proposed Roadmap 
Implementing and managing this organizational change process will be 
challenging. First, CA must internalize its newly defined identity and begin to act on it 
through branding and strategic messaging. Branding will reinforce this new identity as it 
is expressed in the new creed, a revitalized history, and new symbols. Building on these 
advances, CA is better positioned to communicate with its stakeholders with one voice 
and a consistent strategic message. These three actions will help leaders strengthen the 
common organizational identity across the Regiment. 
Next in the change process are the HRM prototypes of recruitment, selection, and 
training. All are critical in standardizing CA skill sets across the force so that 
stakeholders can reliably depend on a team’s capabilities regardless of its component or 
unit designation. As discussed in Chapter V, these three prototypes will be implemented 
for both AC and RC as ongoing efforts to rebuild the CA brand. Leveraging CA’s new 
brand power will likely increase recruitment, particularly through the proposed recruiting 
mechanisms, Army commissioning sources, branch transfers, and the 38X program. 
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Numbers will increase initially due to more recruiting options, but CAAS will allow only 
those with the key CA attributes to begin their training. Subsequent training in CAQC 
will determine who has the required knowledge, skills, and abilities to move forward and 
join the Regiment. These steps require CA leadership to make some hard choices for the 
betterment of the Regiment, potentially impacting funding allocations, organizational 
structure, and organizational culture. In addition, consolidating recruitment, selection and 
training into one standard will challenge leaders to build a consensus among the different 
organizations. Such leaders likely will have to assume political risks to bridge the deep 
divides within the current CA Regiment. 
Within the change process, professionalizing the force requires a paradigm shift: 
from CA as a branch in the U.S. Army to CA as a Corps more in line with a specialty 
branch.19 A shift of Regimental control from the CA Commandant to a CA Board (Figure 
25, Chapter V) integrates a multi-disciplinary quality assurance mechanism to screen out 
the unfit. In addition, the CA professionalization prototype entails selecting partner 
universities to develop CA-specific curricula, establishing credentialing criteria, and 
interacting with the Army systems for DOTMLPF-P20 requirements.  
The last proposed step in the change process pertains to the force structure, 
arguably the most politically contentious prototype to implement since the proposed 
changes include removal of four one-star billets. The most expensive of the force 
structure change proposals and the most difficult, it requires a functional multi-
component organization that can execute daily tasks, administrative tasks, training, and 
operational deployments. However, the short- to long-term benefits will include 
improved coordination, cooperation, and division of labor that will improve 
interoperability and contribute to the Regiment’s overall readiness, organizational 
culture, and strategic relevance.  
In sum, maturing the force requires leaders to change the institutional norms, 
transform both the CA Regiment and how it interacts with its stakeholders, improve 
                                                 
19 Current specialty branches include the Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps, the Medical Corps, 
and the Chaplaincy Corps. 
20 Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities and policy. 
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existing core competencies to ensure the Regiment’s strategic relevance, and develop 
new capabilities for a dramatically changing environment. Such leaders are rare, and yet 
the Regiment needs them now to assist in implementing this proposed strategic design. 
B. MANAGING PROTOTYPES 
1. Proposed Plan 
During the feedback session with the CA Regiment at Fort Bragg, N.C., the 
authors presented the prototypes, along with the list of recommended sponsors for each of 
them as seen in Table 28. This request for sponsorship received a variety of responses: 
praises that guides and mentors were seen as critical in the change process; offers to open 
access to information and contacts; and request for higher resolution prototypes before 
implementation could be launched. But beyond these general statements, there was 
virtually no further public commitment from the Regiment, suggesting some senior- and 
mid-leader apprehension in support of the changes. Although this tepid response may 
imply concern about the project’s political risks, the authors were encouraged by the 
strong positive responses among the many leaders both inside and outside the Regiment 
who privately expressed their strong interests and support for the capstone project. A 
gradual consensus appears to be building that change is needed and in the authors’ view 
some people are just more willing and ready to support it. As one design team exclaimed, 
"This opportunity only comes around once in a lifetime and I want to make sure that I 
leave a legacy for the CA community.”  
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Table 28.   Management of Group Prototypes 
 
2. Updates on Implementation  
The Branding prototypes are in the initial phases of implementation. Future 
updates on implementation will be maintained on the Civil Affairs 2025 Design online 
community page on the All Partners Access Network (APAN) at https://community.apan. 
org/ca2025design/default.aspx. 
a. Prototype 2b Branding; CA Creed 
Due to the overwhelming support for the CA creed, the commandant requested it 
for action. Such action entails presenting both versions of the creed (see Figures 17 and 
47) to his staff for their recommended changes through the Army channels. 
b. Prototype 2c Branding; Unifying Symbols 
The Civil Affairs Qualification Course (CAQC) recognizes students’ excellence 
with recommend symbols. Current, honor graduates receive a tomahawk from 3rd BN, 
1st SWTG (A), which signifies the Soldier with highest GPA during the course and his or 
her ability to show a high degree of promise in CA. The coveted tomahawk comes with 
the following citation:  
The tomahawk for Civil Affairs traces its lineage to the United States 
expansion westward when personnel like Lewis and Clark and James 
Beckwourth were hand selected for their skill to assist in obtaining access 
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for the eventual expansion to come. The tomahawk is the choice between 
war and peace; it represents the ability shape and builds the environment 
through its use a tool. The sharpened edge represents the ability to degrade 
and exploit through its use as a weapon, and the pipe bowl the ability to 
promote diplomacy or peace when objectives have been reached. This 
same spirit still embodies the role of Civil Affairs within Special Warfare. 
(M. Finnegan, personal communication, May 15, 2015) 
C. RECOMMENDED PATHWAY  
1. Regimental Council 
A recommended way ahead came from a Regimental leader. During a phone 
feedback session, an experienced senior-level CA officer offered the authors a vehicle to 
guide implementation. “You guys [the authors] have done a lot of great work and taken 
this deep issue to a higher level,” he remarked, “Let the Regiment help you move this 
idea forward.” He proposed establishing a Council of Colonels for senior leaders from all 
organizations within CA Regiment to assemble on a monthly or quarterly basis. In these 
meetings, the senior leadership would confer on the Regiment’s challenges and 
collaborate on solutions for implementation within the Regiment or through the Army’s 
change process. One change the authors would add to his proposal is the representation 
from senior NCOs to this Regimental Council. In the authors’ experiences, NCOs are 
often overlooked and yet constitute a powerful driver in the change process. 
2. The Next Design Thinking Workshop 
The authors recommend a second iteration of the CA 2025 Design Thinking 
workshop, with a focus on the external stakeholders who no doubt will view CA’s 
strategic design with a different set of lenses to view and refine the prototypes. During 
the first iteration of the Design Thinking workshop, the authors and the design team 
members recognized the value of the discussions with non-CA personnel during the 
Discovery phase. Some senior-level feedback affirmed the design team’s observation; 
there is a difference between how the Regiment views itself and how others view it. The 
second iteration of the Design Thinking workshop should aim to: (1) examine CA’s 
strategic design from external stakeholder perspective, (2) design a plan to bridge any gap 
between the external and internal stakeholder perspectives and modify the prototypes as 
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appropriate, (3) design a Regimental succession plan to develop the leadership needed for 
the transformation process, and (4) institutionalize Design Thinking Methodology as an 
organic planning capability within the Regiment to generate innovative solutions on an 
ongoing basis for complex problems.  
The authors recommend that the proposed Regimental Council provide the 
sponsorship for future Design Thinking workshops in order to foster a culture of 
collaboration and innovation within the CA community.  
D. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS  
Change requires true leadership, social entrepreneurs, and sponsors… So 
go find committed sponsors and leaders to protect your entrepreneurship 
and you will have a chance at lasting change!  
—Dr. Nancy Roberts, 
Design Thinking workshop organizer 
 
After 14 years of war, General Raymond T. Odierno, Army Chief of Staff, and 
John M. McHugh, Secretary of the Army, (2015) recognize that the U.S. Army is at an 
inflection point in the face of the new fiscal reality and an increasingly complex security 
environment (p. 2). The CA Regiment has its own inflection point, after ten years of rapid 
growth following CA’s designation as a branch in the U.S. Army of 2006. In addition to 
the successes it has achieved, and the recognition it has received from JFCs, COMs, and 
UAPs for its integral role in proactive engagement to advance U.S. interests, the CA 
Regiment continues to face many challenges. As the Army evolves and changes in 
response to the dynamic global security environment, so too must CA. The aim of this 
capstone has been to assist CA in strategically redesigning itself for the future.  
Design Thinking was a suitable and useful method for two mid-level officers who 
sought to launch a bottom-up change effort to transform the CA Regiment. The five steps 
in Design Thinking methodology are simple and intuitive, and yet can be applied to a 
complex design or change effort, such as CA 2025. Its collaborative, multi-disciplinary 
approach, with a bias towards action and prototyping, enabled the authors and the design 
team to achieve significant progress in short amount of time. It was a process of learning 
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and evolving for the authors and many of the design team members, particularly during 
the Discovery phase. It broadened their understanding of the ongoing challenges facing 
the Regiment, and enabled them to overcome their own biases, open up to different 
perspectives, and to create innovative solutions to benefit the entire Regiment. 
The authors recognize that many challenges remain ahead for CA’s 2025 strategic 
design. The transition from rough prototypes to implementable action plans requires 
much more refinement and ongoing collaborative efforts. A dedicated design team and 
continued support from committed sponsors are needed to carry CA 2025 forward. 
However, the authors are optimistic about the future. Despite the frustrations, angst, and 
distrust members of the CA Regiment have expressed, the authors also heard expressions 
of commitment and belief in the CA mission and its future. There is a strong sense of 
pride in what the Regiment has achieved especially in the last 14 years of conflict. There 
is also a strong sense of hope among the younger members of the CA Regiment, who 
want to be a part of a CA Regiment that is well selected, trained, educated, and led in 
order to effectively deliver CA’s unique capability in the human domain. CA’s 
transformation to become a force of the future requires the collective effort of the entire 
Regiment; this capstone is merely the beginning of the effort. 
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APPENDIX A. PRE-WORKSHOP ARCHIVAL RECORD 
A. CA LINEAGE: DEVELOPMENT OF A CIVIL-MILITARY ENTERPRISE 
After the Continental Congress sensed an opportunity for rebellion against the 
British among the French Canadians, the Continental Army conducted its first MG and 
CA activities with the invasion of Quebec, Canada in 1775. Following the death of 
Continental Army General Montgomery during a failed assault on Quebec City, General 
David Wooster assumed command of the expedition and—through his reckless disregard 
for local traditions—managed to alienate the local populace. Despite the Continental 
Congress’s attempt to salvage the misadministration of MG under General Wooster by 
dispatching a diplomatic team headed by Benjamin Franklin to Montreal, the situation 
deteriorated beyond repair, resulting in the withdrawal of American troops from Quebec 
(Sandler, 1994, pp. 1–2). A successful implementation of MG by the U.S. Army was not 
realized until General Winfield Scott assumed control of territory during the Mexican 
War. On February 20, 1847, General Scott issued the bi-lingual General Order No. 20 
governing the conduct of U.S. forces and Mexicans under U.S. jurisdiction in Vera Cruz. 
The order marked the first use of the term Military Government. Intent on preserving the 
local administrative system, Scott extended full honors to the capitulating Mexican army, 
local magistrates and clergy. After turning over control of the Vera Cruz MG to Brigadier 
General William Worth, Scott marched on to establish similarly successful MGs in 
Tampico, Puebla and Mexico city (Sandler, 1994, pp. 35–40).  
Post-Civil War reconstruction saw MG enacted differently under different 
Military Governors. While Major General Benjamin F. Butler’s heavy-handed tactics 
through violent suppression of protests and the press in New Orleans backfired and 
generated resentment among the local populace, Major General George B. McClellan 
shared Scott’s view of preserving public order and protecting political rights under MG 
(Sandler, 1994, pp. 51–54). In order to set federal MG policy, President Lincoln 
appointed the Lieber Commission in 1862 to draft The Code of War for the Government 
of the Armies of the U.S. in the Field, which was adopted by the U.S. Army as General 
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Order No. 100. The Lieber Code also formed the basis for the subsequent Hague 
Conventions and the Geneva Convention (Sandler, 1994, pp. 54–55).  
During the Spanish-American War in 1889, the U.S. Army administered MG in 
Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines under the Lieber Code and the 2nd Hague 
Convention. While MG remained relatively peaceful in Cuba and Puerto Rico, with 
authority ultimately returned to the indigenous civil governments, a large number of 
Filipinos waged an extended rebellion against the U.S. Army MG administration 
established on 19 May 1898 in the Philippines (Sandler, 1994, pp. 97–114). However, 
instead of adopting a heavy-handed approach, the American units conducted Civic Action 
activities to improve local conditions and enhance U.S. legitimacy. Such a counter-
insurgency strategy proved successful in defeating a pre-Maoist rural insurgency. 
(Sandler, 1994, pp. 118–123). 
The CA/MG doctrine was not officially established in doctrine in the U.S. Army 
until after WWI, in a manual entitled Military Aid to the Civil Power. The manual drew 
from past MG experiences, including the occupation of Rhineland, Germany by the 
American Expeditionary Force following the Armistice of November 11, 1918 (Sandler, 
1994, p. 167). Further developments in the early 1940s, most notably the establishment of 
the School of Military Governance at the University of Virginia on April 2, 1942, set the 
conditions for CA/MG to gain further recognition as a military specialty (Hicks & 
Wormuth, 2009, p. 3). In May 1944, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force 
established a Civil Affairs G-5 staff section to control the European CA Division 
(ECAD) composed of 2,500 officers and 5,000 enlisted personnel (Sandler, 1994, p. 187). 
The ECAD conducted CA/MG operations to maintain law and order, secure the populace 
and minimize civilian interference with military operations by working through or with 
local governments when possible (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, p. 4). By mid-1945, most 
sub-national governance in Germany was administered by German officials under ECAD 
advisement (Zink, 1946, p. 346). In fact, during WWII, less than 9,000 ECAD personnel 
administered control of more than 80 million persons—half of whom enemy nationals—
in seven countries, with almost no resistance (Sandler, 1994, p. 210). By not uprooting 
the bureaucracies in any of their occupied territories and preserving local order, the U.S. 
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MG administrations established the roots for future success with both Germany and 
Japan, subsequently achieving great economic success and, more importantly, lasting 
peace after WWII (Sandler, 1994, pp. 284–285). 
On August 26, 1945 in Monterey, California, the U.S. Army activated the first 
permanent MG units, the 95th and 96th MG Groups, both of which experienced a series 
of activations and inactivations until the 1970s. The U.S. Army also established the first 
peacetime CA/MG units in 1949, followed by RC special units consisting of HQs and 
school units (Sandler, 1994, p. 308). Following the Korean War, the Department of the 
Army (DA) established the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) CA/MG officer branch, which 
was subsequently redesignated the CA branch on 2 October 1959. The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS) placed MG mission under the concept of CA, making CA the “all-inclusive 
term” for the branch (Sandler, 1994, pp. 337–338). 
In 1965, at the request of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), 
the 41st CA was the first of the three U.S. Army CA Companies deployed to Republic of 
Vietnam (RVN) as part of the U.S. effort to stabilize the situation (Sacquety, 2013, p. 
52). With roughly 60 officers and 100 enlisted personnel per Company, the CA missions 
in Vietnam focused on three primary objectives: (1) Eliminate the Vietcong (VC) 
insurgency, (2) Diminish the VC’s ability to recruit, and (3) Recruit indigenous tribes to 
fight the VC and the communist National Liberation Front (NLF) (Hicks & Wormuth, 
2009, p. 6). These CA units operated primarily at the tactical level as part of the Civil 
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program while under the 
operational control of U.S. Army or U.S. Marines combat units. The most common 
activities included Civic Action projects to repair schools, medical dispensaries, bridges, 
culverts, and infrastructures in the rural areas (Sacquety, 2013, p. 53). After the Tet 
offensive in 1968, CA forces in Vietnam shifted their emphasis from relief to refugees 
and restoration projects to long term development of viable communities. Units also 
transitioned from undertaking the projects themselves to assisting the RVN 
administrators and local leaders (Sandler, 1994, p. 360). 
In 1972, the CA school relocated to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and became part 
of the Institute for Military Assistance, which later became the USAJFCSWCS. The 96th 
 118
CA Group, after its reactivation in 1967, was redesignated as the 96th CA BN(A) on 
November 26, 1971, and moved to Fort Bragg in 1972 to be attached to the 95th CA 
Group. When the 95th CA was inactivated on December 18, 1974, the 96th CA BN(A) 
became the only AC CA unit (Sandler, 1994, p. 373).  
During Operation URGENT FURY (1983) in Grenada and Operation JUST 
CAUSE (1989) in Panama, both AC and RC CA units deployed to provide combat 
support and restore the local governance functions and essential services. While both CA 
missions were successful, lessons learned highlighted the importance of high-level CMO 
planning, interagency coordination and pre-deployment preparation. In addition, 
URGENT FURY renewed the U.S. Army’s emphasis on SOF and CA. When 
USSOCOM was established in 1987, CA was given “a high priority as one of the 10 
special activities” assigned to the new command. Consequently, all U.S. Army CA 
forces—both RC and AC—were reassigned to USSOCOM. After the activations of 
USASOC in 1989 and subsequently its subordinate USACAPOC(A), all U.S. Army CA 
forces were assigned to USACAPOC(A) (Sandler, 1994, pp. 373–376). 
After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991, CA played an important role in preventing 
civilians from interfering with combat operations by managing the influx of displaced 
personnel and providing much needed HA to the affected populace (Hicks & Wormuth, 
2009, p. 7). Throughout Operations DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM and 
PROVIDE COMFORT, U.S. Army CA deployed two companies from the 96th CA and 
four RC CA Brigades. The length and scale of the deployment highlighted the need for 
RC and AC elements to complement one another in operational capacity, as well as in 
skillsets (Sandler, 1994, pp. 431–432). During the 1990s, both RC and AC CA forces 
deployed to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo on various HA and peacekeeping 
missions, working with civilian populations and institutions, military, intergovernmental 
and non-governmental organizations (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, pp. 8–10).  
In 2001, the 96th CA BN(A) deployed during the early phase of OEF. CA 
missions ranged from teams with TF DAGGER conducting civil assessments to the 
CJCMOTF in Kabul coordinating relief efforts after the Taliban were routed (Stewart, 
2004, p. 19). The RC CA teams subsequently deployed to expand the CA mission in 
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Afghanistan, providing support to PRTs and BCTs (Bingham, Rubini, & Cleary, 2003, p. 
12). While the RC CA also supported PRTs and BCTs during OIF, the AC teams 
deployed primarily with USSOF throughout the CENTCOM AOR, including with 
CMSEs working for COMs in select countries.  
With the high demand for CA in both Afghanistan and Iraq, Secretary of 
SECDEF Rumsfeld in 2004 directed the DOD to increase the size of CA forces and also 
explore options to assign them to the U.S. Army with the intent of improving CA 
integration with the GPF. Despite resistance from senior DOD leaders, including the 
CJCS and USSOCOM commander, in 2006, USACAPOC(A) along with all RC CA21 
were reassigned to the USAR, while the 96th CA BN(A),22 as the only AC CA unit, 
remained under USASOC. Such action effectively split the CA structure along the AC-
RC line and set conditions for many of the organizational issues that currently plague CA 
as a branch. Following the split, the 96th CA BN(A) grew into the 95th CA BDE(A), 
currently with five Battalions: 91st aligned with AFRICOM, 92nd with EUCOM, 96th 
with CENTCOM, 97th with PACOM, and 98th with SOUTHCOM. In addition, the 85th 
CA BDE was activated in 2011 as another AC CA unit under FORSCOM to provide CA 
support to GPF. 
B. STRATEGIC DIRECTION 
Deployed worldwide in support of TSOCs, GCCs and COMs, CA forces have 
demonstrated a unique special warfare capability to enhance U.S. influence over relevant 
populations so as to achieve U.S. objectives. In today’s complex joint operational 
environment, CA forces play an integral role in assisting the JFCs to achieve unified 
action. Unified action requires leaders to “synchronize, coordinate, and when appropriate, 
integrate military operations with the activities of other governmental and 
nongovernmental organizations to achieve unity of effort” (JP 3-0, 2011, p. xi). In 
addition, the latest publications of strategic guidance and doctrine provides the context 
for CA to play an important role in shaping the global environment through proactive 
                                                 
21 96 percent of the U.S. Army CA forces. 
22 4 percent of the U.S. Army CA forces. 
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engagement. Such a role requires the CA Regiment to evolve and adapt to meet the 
dynamic global challenges while achieving the U.S. Army’s vision. 
The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) outlines comprehensive engagement 
as part of the strategic approach to further U.S. interests. Engagement, as defined in the 
2010 NSS, is the active participation of the United States in relationships beyond its 
borders, through partnerships and alliances with its friends and allies, cooperation with 
regional powers, as well as bi-lateral or multi-lateral dialogues with adversarial 
governments to encourage their greater integration with the international community. In 
pursuing comprehensive engagement, the U.S. military plays an important role in 
preventing conflict and responding to crises through military-to-military, civil-military 
relationships in order to build partner capacity, strengthen civilian institutions and 
promote collaboration (White House, 2010, pp. 11–12). The 2015 NSS reemphasizes the 
need for collective action in international engagement to address global challenges. The 
scope of such cooperation, though, is continuously expanding and to date includes state 
partners, non-state and private actors, and international institutions (White House, 2015, 
p. 3). Similarly, the role of the DOD in comprehensive engagement to further U.S. 
interests is also highlighted in the 2014 QDR, which notes the military’s efforts in 
proactive engagement to shape the dynamic global environment (Department of Defense, 
2014b, p. 11). 
In 2014, the DOD updated its policy on CAO by reissuing DOD Directive 
2000.13 Civil Affairs. Most notable among the changes from the previous version are the 
omission of Paragraph 4.8, which designated U.S. Army CA as SOF (Department of 
Defense, 1994, p. 3), and the new responsibility of joint proponency, with coordinating 
authority for CA assigned to the commander of USSOCOM (Department of Defense, 
2014a, p. 9).  
The SOF designation for U.S. Army CA forces—particularly their assignment 
under USSOCOM—has been a subject of debate since 1979, largely stemming from 
concerns by DOD leaders over the level of access to CA support for GPF during major 
combat operations. All CA forces, both reserve and active, were initially assigned to 
USSOCOM upon its activation in 1987 for the categorization of CA as one of the ten 
 121
special warfare activities, and especially for its role in low-intensity conflicts (Sandler, 
1994, p. 376). SECDEF Donald H. Rumsfeld renewed the debate in 2003, and ultimately 
directed the split of U.S. Army CA forces in 2006 (Storey, 2012, p. 15). As a result, all 
RC CA units under USACAPOC(A) were reassigned to the USAR to support GPF 
missions; the 96th CA BN(A) remained under USASOC as the only AC CA unit to 
support USSOCOM missions (Van Roosen, 2009, pp. 2–3).  
In the U.S. Army and joint doctrine, CAO remains among the special operations 
core activities. “While CF also conduct some of these activities (e.g., FID, SFA, foreign 
humanitarian assistance [FHA], and COIN),” JP 3-05 Special Operations describes, 
“SOF conduct all of them using specialized tactics, techniques, and procedures, and in 
unique conditions and to different standards, but in a manner that complements CF 
capabilities” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, pp. II–2-3).  
Proactive engagement, as outlined in the NSS and QDR, is an integral part of the 
Army’s strategic vision—through Regionally Aligned Forces (RAFs) as part of a whole 
of government approach—as articulated by General Raymond T. Odierno, the 38th Army 
CSA, in the 2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG) (U.S. Army, 2014, p. 13). 
In Army 2025 Vision, Odierno and McHugh (2015) identifies both the future 
requirements for increasing the number of operations within and among populations and 
an enhanced ability to consolidate and integrate contributions from government, military, 
and coalition partners (p. 3). CA has an integral role in both of these realms with the 
ability to access, analyze, and influence the relevant populations, as well as the ability to 
coordinate and collaborate with UAPs, HN partners, and the local populace to achieve 
unified action in support of U.S. objectives.  
In his vision for the ARSOF 2022 transformation—which he calls “a blueprint for 
change”—Lieutenant General Charles T. Cleveland, the USASOC commander, outlines 
his priorities for future ARSOF: (1) Invest in Human Capital, (2) Optimize 
SOF/Conventional Force/JIIM23 Interdependence, (3) Operationalize the CONUS base, 
(4) Develop SOF Capabilities at the operational level, (5) Facilitate SOF Mission 
                                                 
23 Joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational. 
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Command, and (6) Optimize Resourcing and Commodity Areas (U.S. Army Special 
Operations Command, 2013, pp. 3, 18). ARSOF 2022 describes the 7th WfF, introduces 
the Human Domain concept, and highlights how SOF are “uniquely assessed, selected, 
trained, educated and equipped to affect and influence human behavior” (U.S. Army 
Special Operations Command, 2014, p. 4). The 95th CA BDE(A) is taking steps through 
its redesign to mature the profession, address capability gaps, and strengthen 
interdependence with CF and UAPs. The BDE is developing the “Civil Affairs 
Science”—in cooperation with U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and 
School (USAJFKSWCS) and UAPs—to accelerate the professionalization of SOF CA in 
support of special warfare. Additionally, the BDE is developing Civil Information Node 
to enhance information sharing and collection with UAPs; optimizing partnerships with 
UAPs through the establishment of the CMAG; and providing specially trained CA 
planners to key operational and training SOF commands to enhance SOF/CF/JIIM 
Interdependence (U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2014, pp. 19–24). 
C. CORPORATE BRANDING: AN UNDERPERFORMING CA BRAND 
In the rich, multi-disciplinary field of organizational studies of the identity 
concept, corporate identity and organizational identity are the two disciplines more 
frequently selected to discuss the identity of an organization and how it relates to the 
stakeholders. Stakeholders are categorized as external, or those outside of the 
organization (i.e., customers, investors, the public), and internal, or the members of the 
organization. Hatch and Schultz (2000) discuss both corporate identity and organizational 
identity, and take a combined approach in examining the relational aspects among image 
(as perceived by stakeholders), organizational identity and culture. A corporate identity 
communicates four things to external stakeholders: who we are, what we do, how we do 
it, and where we want to go (p. 13). Formulation of a corporate identity involves 
choosing symbols by the top management and their staff, taking into considerations 
perceptions and reactions of organizational members (p. 17). The concept of 
organizational identity, on the other hand, is self-reflective with three defining attributes 
for an identity statement: central (what is seen as the core, or essence of the 
organization), distinctive (what distinguishes the organization from others), and enduring 
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(the organization’s temporal continuity) (Albert & Whetten, 1985, p. 265; Hatch & 
Schultz, 2000, p. 15; Whetten, 2006, p. 220). For the purposes of this capstone, the 
authors also take a combined approach in examining the organizational identity of the CA 
Regiment with a focus on how its influential role in decision-making, sense-making, and 
fostering relationships between regimental members relates to the branding of the CA 
Regiment. 
The concept of product branding emerged in the late nineteenth century and has 
contributed great successes for businesses (Olins, 2000, pp. 52–53). The scope of a 
product brand is limited to one product or service, or a group of closely related products. 
A brand identity is developed by advertisers, who are informed by market research, and 
then targeted to customers. Corporate branding is much more expansive in scope and 
scale, encompassing the entire enterprise and all of its stakeholders. In addition, the 
origins of a corporate brand include not only the organization’s heritage, but also the 
values and beliefs shared by its members. The target audience is also expanded to include 
multiple stakeholders—both internal and external. In further discussion of corporate 
branding, Hatch & Schultz (2008) introduce the Vision-Culture-Image (VCI) Alignment 
Model (Figure 31) to examine the coherence of an organization’s strategic vision (who 
we want to be), its culture (who we are), and the stakeholder image, i.e., expectations by 
the external stakeholders of the organization (their image of us). With organizational 
identity at the center of the model, a greater coherence between the vision, culture, and 
image indicates a stronger brand; misalignments, or gaps between the three conversely 
indicate an underperforming brand (pp. 8–12). 
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Figure 31.  The VCI Alignment Model (from Hatch & Schultz, 2008, p. 11) 
Despite the detailed description of the CA Regiment, its role, and capabilities in 
doctrine, misalignments in the VCI model persist for the Regiment, indicating an 
underperforming CA brand. FM 3-57 Civil Affairs Operations (Department of the Army, 
2014a) defines the mission of CA forces as to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society 
and conduct responsibilities normally performed by civil governments across the range 
of military operations by engaging and influencing the civil populace and authorities 
through the planning and conducting of CAO, or to enable CMO, to shape the civil 
environment and set the conditions for military operations. CA forces plan, prepare for, 
execute, assess, and transition CAO at all levels of war (p. 1–1). CAO are further defined 
as actions planned, executed, and assessed by civil affairs forces that enhance awareness 
of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; 
identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the 
application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government 
(p. 1–2). In addition, FM 3-57 provides detailed description of the five CA core tasks: 
populace and resource control (PRC), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), civil 
information management (CIM), nation assistance (NA), and support to civil 
administration (SCA). Various widely disseminated joint publications, such as JP 3-57, 
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also provide similar detailed description of CAO and CMO. However, during the Change 
of Command ceremony for USACAPOC(A) in June 2014, Major General Jeffrey Jacobs, 
the outgoing commander, remarked that  
what the Army is not getting is a conventional force that fully understands 
the roles and mission capabilities of Civil Affairs units. I observed long 
ago that many conventional maneuver commanders, although are experts 
of employing their engineers, their aviation, their fire support, their 
logistics assets, you name it, they come up short when understanding how 
to employ their Civil Affairs forces … unless and until we can fix that 
disconnect, we, USACAPOC, cannot provide the best possible Civil 
Affairs support to the United States Army and the Army will not truly 
interest itself in CA and Civil Affairs will not achieve full equality as a 
branch of the Army … now I understand this is a complex issue; I know 
it’s a politically charged issue within the Army. (Wells, 2014)  
Such frustration over the “persistent deficiencies in commanders’ understanding 
of CA capabilities and how to use them”—or a strategic vision-stakeholder image 
misalignment—has been invariably observed at different times throughout CA history, 
from CA assets being merely perceived as “disaster relief teams” during the Korean War, 
to similar confusions during Operations DESERT STORM and DESERT SHIELD 
(Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, pp. 15–16). Confusions among military and civilian decision 
makers over the difference between CA and MG—the latter a more politically sensitive 
term suggesting long-term occupation and likely nation building effort—resulted in 
missed opportunities in proper employment of CA in the pacification effort in South 
Vietnam (Sandler, 1994, p. 356). Once deployed to RVN, a CA commander also 
observed the same insufficient understanding of CA’s role, the lack of CMO guidance by 
military commanders, and consequently the lack of support for CA forces in theater 
(Sacquety, 2013, p. 52). Another observation in the 2009 Center for Strategic 
International Studies (CSIS) report was perhaps the most succinct: 
Not only is there a dearth of senior advocates for civil affairs within DOD, 
there also is a profound lack of familiarity with civil affairs missions and 
forces outside the immediate civil affairs community itself. Civil affairs is 
not part of the broader education and training curriculum within military 
schoolhouses, experience with civil affairs in the broader Army is very 
limited, and anecdotes of negative experiences with civil affairs personnel 
in the field are common, although in many cases the negative experiences 
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are by-products of the stepchild status of civil affairs. While the special 
operations community has a greater familiarity with civil affairs than do 
general purpose forces, because they have operated with civil affairs for 
many years, there is still relatively little understanding or appreciation 
even in this community for the capabilities of civil affairs forces or how 
civil affairs forces operate in the field. (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, p. 39)  
While doctrine alone has failed to sufficiently inform JFCs on CA’s mission, roles 
and capabilities, the trifurcation of U.S. Army CA forces—95th BDE(A), 85th BDE, and 
USACAPOC(A)—has only added to the confusion among decision makers (Walsh, 2013, 
p. 20) who systemically lack experienced CA personnel on their staff, (Little, 2013, p. 
29), resulting in misemployment and mismanagement of CA forces.  
As candidly observed by two USSOF officers during Operation JUST CAUSE, 
Professional military education (PME) is one area to be considered in improving JFCs 
understanding of CA’s roles and capabilities: 
Tactical commanders were often unaware of the full scope of a CA unit’s 
capabilities, indicating a need for including instruction on CA doctrine, 
missions, and capabilities in all branch officer basic courses, all branch 
officer advanced courses, the Command and General Staff Course, and the 
War College. (Sandler, 1994, p. 401) 
Additionally, in order to realign the CA strategic vision, its roles and capabilities 
with external stakeholders’ expectations, strategic communication between the CA 
Regiment and the external stakeholders (JFCs, UAPs, policy makers) needs to be 
reexamined in these areas: (1) the projection of a clear strategic message, (2) the 
projection of that message through existing communication channels, and (3) the 
reinforcement of that strategic message with positive experiences for the stakeholders. A 
clear strategic message first and foremost requires consensus among CA practitioners 
from both the RC and AC on a common, core CA identity. Therefore, a common 
organization identity that is central, distinctive, and enduring needs to be developed and 
adopted by the Regiment.  
Efforts to inform can also be facilitated through engagement, collaboration, 
dialogues and discussions, all of which require access to the desired audience. Such 
access for advocacy, particularly to key decision makers, necessitates the placements of 
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capable strategic communicators—CA practitioners who have received advanced training 
in national level strategy and policy guidance, strategic planning, and strategic 
communication—in key liaison and staff positions with UAPs, TSOCs, ASCCs and 
GCCs (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, p. 35). Moreover, a clear strategic message propagated 
successfully to its audience still needs to be reinforced by measurable results delivered by 
capable CA forces. Stakeholders’ poor anecdotal experiences with CA elements—
regardless of their organizational origins, components, or skill sets—can still potentially 
diminish the effectiveness of strategic messaging, while also widening the organizational 
culture-stakeholder image misalignment in the VCI Alignment Model. To mitigate such 
misalignment, CA units need to deliver the expected results for the relevant stakeholders 
in a manner consistent its strategic message. Clear challenges remain for the CA 
Regiment until recruitment, selection, and training of its personnel can be standardized in 
order to establish a baseline in specialty skills not only aligned to its strategic vision, but 
also as expected by stakeholders. 
D. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN: CA REGIMENT’S ONGOING 
CHALLENGES  
Due to the complexities and nuances inherent in human-centered affairs, CA 
practitioners frequently encounter unexpected situations and novel events. In addition, 
CA planning process requires critical analysis, reinforced with adaptive thinking in order 
to devise innovative solutions that fit the different environment settings. A solution that 
yields desired effects in one locale, with a particular populace, may not, and often does 
not, work for other locales. While a variety of U.S. Army field manuals and joint 
publications provide general guidelines for the CA work processes, CAO and CMO are 
commonly conducted in an environment where the cause of, or solution to, a problem is 
not clear, requiring CA practitioners to rely on their operational experience and intuition.  
The high demand for CA support during Operations OEF and OIF—in excess of 
1,100 personnel every 9–10 months at its highest point—resulted in high deployment 
rates and large number of CA units (Edwards, 2012, p. 8). To meet such high demand, 
quality of training suffered, especially for the RC units that received diluted and 
insufficiently certified programs of instruction (POIs). In addition, USAR took drastic 
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measures, such as the redesignations of entire RC companies from low-demand MOS 
(e.g., Chemical Support) to provisional CA status24 in order to supplement the RC CA 
units from USACAPOC(A) in Iraq. While the officers from these provisional units 
attended an abbreviated course called Mobilization Civil Affairs Training (MCAT) that 
lasted about two and half months at Fort Bragg, NC, the non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs) and soldiers were “familiarized with their new specialties” during their one-
month reclassification training at Fort Dix, NJ (Chace, 2009). The resultant poor 
preparation in CA specialty skills, coupled with a lack of operational experience, did not 
sufficiently prepare such units for CAO in support of stability operations. When faced 
with complex tasks of assessing, analyzing, and influencing the civil component, the ill-
trained CA units instead focused their efforts on simpler “winning hearts and minds” 
tasks, e.g., reconstruction projects and delivery of HA supplies, in many cases without 
sufficient analyses of the operational environment. Poorly planned, conducted and 
managed reconstruction projects were not only ineffective in enhancing U.S. influence or 
HN legitimacy, but also potentially detrimental to the overall coalition efforts. The roles 
of project managers and HA supply deliverers, as typically assigned to many deployed 
CA personnel, became the only CA roles as perceived by stakeholders, particularly the 
JFCs, UAPs and relevant populations. Such negative experiences diminished the effects 
of strategic messaging by the CA Regiment, widened the misalignments between 
strategic vision, organizational culture, and stakeholder image, and ultimately weakened 
the CA brand. 
An analysis of the organizational structure of the CA Regiment also reveals other 
capability gaps hindering its overall readiness and organizational cohesion. Under the 
current CA force structure (Figure 32), the main departmentation is based on component 
(RC or AC), the COCOMs to which CA forces provide support, and the geographical 
AORs. The main unit groupings are summarized in Table 29, to include the 95th CA 
BDE(A) assigned to 1st SFC(A) under USASOC as force provider for USSOF; the 85th 
CA BDE assigned to FORSCOM as force provider for GPF; and USACAPOC(A) 
assigned to USAR under FORSCOM, also as force provider for GPF. The 361st and 
                                                 
24 Provisional units would revert to their original designations upon redeployment. 
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322nd CA BDEs are organic units providing direct support only to their respective 
ASCCs.25  
The three distinct command structures under which the 95th CA BDE(A), the 
85th CA BDE and USACAPOC(A) are assigned prove problematic for the division of 
labor and coordination mechanisms. The 95th CA BDE(A) provides CA forces for 
TSOCs and COMs under the CME program; and Joint Task Forces (JTFs). In addition, 
the BDE participates in Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) activities, such as JCET 
exercises to build partner capacity. For overseas contingency operations (OCO), the 95th 
also provides forces as needed to support GCCs. Due to the wide spectrum of mission 
sets and high demand signal, operational tempo remains high for the 95th with many 
validated missions it cannot fill. With the 95th’s personnel having the highest deployment 
rates in USASOC, the BDE struggles to manage dwell ratios to mitigate operational 
fatigue and burn-out of its personnel. 
Table 29.   Main Unit Groupings of U.S. Army CA Forces 
Main Grouping Component Organizational Structure Customers 
95th CA BDE(A) AC 5 regionally aligned BNs TSOCs, COMs, JTFs, GCCs (contingency) 
85th CA BDE AC 5 regionally aligned BNs BCTs, DIVs, Corps, ASCCs 
USACAPOC(A) RC 7 BDEs under 4 regionally aligned CACOMs BCTs, DIVS, Corps, ASCCs, GCCs 
361st CA BDE RC HQ and 1 BN USAREUR 
322nd CA BDE RC HQ USARPAC 
 
                                                 




Figure 32.  Current CA Force Structure (after Ferry & Romero, 2013, p. 59)26 
The high demand signal for CA support to GPF during OIF and OEF led to the 
U.S. Army’s authorization for another active CA BDE in March, 2010 to raise the 
distribution of AC CA to about 20 percent of the total CA forces in the U.S. Army 
(Storey, 2012, p. 11). Six months later, OIF transitioned to Operation NEW DAWN, 
signifying the end of major combat operations by the U.S. military in Iraq. The 85th CA 
BDE was finally activated in September 2011 in Fort Hood, TX, initially with two BNs, 
and three more to be activated subsequently with personnel from CAQC and the 95th. In 
December 2011, as the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) signed by President Bush in 
2008 expired, the United States withdrew its troops from Iraq. As a new unit struggling to 
fill its ranks while building its capability and reputation, the 85th BDE did not begin to 
deploy its CA personnel until 2012, with a few companies in support of OEF, and others 
in support of TSC activities, such as Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) exercises. In addition to 
the manning shortfalls, the 85th CA BDE, as a relatively new unit, is not yet part of the 
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle of the Planning, Programing, Budget and 
Execution (PPBE) process. Consequently, funding for the BDE’s equipment, training and 
deployments continues on an ad hoc basis with FORSCOM and the GCCs. As NATO 
                                                 
26 Adopted from Ferry and Romero and modified from the original source to reflect current structure 
after the activation of 1SFC(A). 
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concluded its combat operations in Afghanistan in December, 2014, the demand for CA 
support, particularly from GPF, significantly dropped. In the new fiscal reality with more 
budget constraints driving force reductions, the 85th is currently at risk of being 
downsized. 
For the RC CA units, the high deployment rates in support of OIF and OEF 
resulted in operational fatigue, as well as a brain drain of its functional specialties, as 
many RC personnel left the force (Edwards, 2012, p. 9). The reduced quality in training 
and selection of personnel—in a desperate effort to fill its ranks—further degraded the 
capabilities of the USACAPOC(A). In the same hostile environment of budget 
constraints and force reductions, a lower demand signal for RC CA also spells troubles 
for USACAPOC(A). Efforts, such as the establishment of the IMSG at Fort Bragg, NC to 
professionalize and certify the functional specialists will slowly rebuild such capacity for 
the RC. 
The organization of CA forces—particularly for the 95th, 85th and 
USACAPOC(A) under three distinct chains of command—also contributed to degraded 
coordination between the three. Informal, or ad hoc communication, which is vital in 
nonroutine and ambiguous situations (Daft, 2010, p. 234), has been sporadic and heavily 
hamstrung by conflicting personalities and bureaucratic institutional constraints. As the 
main force providers to all five major AORs,27 personnel from the three organizations 
frequently operate not only in the same countries, but also in sub-national level locales. 
However, a troubling trend of territorialism and parochialism persists at the detriment of 
collaboration and the pooled interdependence of these CA personnel (Daft, 2010, p. 287). 
Coordination through formal hierarchy—at home stations or on deployments—works to 
some extent, depending on the flexibility and efficiency of the reporting and coordinating 
channels established. This coordination mechanism is, however, not a good fit for the 
unstable and dynamic environment where CA practitioners operate. Coordination through 
standardized skills presents another problem—given the disparities in training, education 
and experience between AC and RC, resulting in a wide spectrum of skill levels and 
operational experiences (Daft, 2010, pp. 234–236).  
                                                 
27 AFRICOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM. 
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Professionalization of the CA Regiment has suffered from the multiple training 
pipelines with inconsistent standards, brain drain from high deployments, as well as the 
lack of proper certification for the functional specialists. The ill-trained RC CA units—
such as the provisional CA units during OIF—and poorly executed training programs, 
such as MCAT diluted the skillsets and tarnished the credibility of CA as a branch. The 
dire need to fill the RC CA ranks persists, with quality vs. quantity calculus a haunting 
dilemma for USACAPOC(A) leadership. A troubling trend exists with RC units filling 
their ranks with insufficiently vetted personnel to be reported as part of their manning 
strength while these personnel await their opportunities to go through one of the training 
pipelines to become MOS qualified (MOSQ). Many such personnel assumed key 
positions (e.g., CMOC chief, Company command, CMO planner, etc.) while non-MOSQ, 
and even deployed as such, ultimately relying on on-the-job training and trial-and-error 
modus operandi. The failures by unqualified or poorly trained CA personnel to deliver 
results continue to accentuate the inconsistencies in strategic messaging about CA roles 
and capabilities. 
E. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE: A FRACTURED CA REGIMENT 
Literature on organizational theories recognizes the significance of organizational 
culture. Daft (2003) contends that culture often attributes to organizational success or 
failure because it serves two critical functions in an organization: internal integration and 
external adaptation. Internal integration occurs with members developing a collective 
common identity and learning to collaborate and cooperate effectively. An adaptability 
culture—characterized by strategic focus on the external environment through flexibility 
and change—helps an organization respond rapidly to changes in the external 
environment and needs of the customers (pp. 112–113). Furthermore, organizational 
culture has a unifying power with a focus on the collective interest of the organization 
through shared systems of beliefs, habits, and traditions that form a shared identity 
(Quinn, Mintzberg, & James, 1988, pp. 344–346). A lack of common CA identity 
manifests in degraded collaboration and cooperation along the AC/RC divide, and to a 
lesser extent the 85th /95th divide. Internal integration within the CA Regiment is further 
complicated by parochialism and personality conflicts. In addition, to foster an 
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adaptability culture responsive to increasingly complex and unstable operational 
environments, CA practitioners need to be screened, recruited, selected and trained to be 
adaptive thinkers. While embracing the broad range of skill sets from core competencies 
to functional specialties across the CA Regiment, shared systems of values and beliefs 
based on commonalities among the members of the Regiment must be strengthened, 
starting with recruitment, to realize the unifying power of organizational culture. 
Given shared assumptions—or the internalized beliefs and values that members of 
an organization hold in common—Sathe (1985) asserts that the content of an 
organizational culture is determined by how they interrelate, or more specifically, how 
they are prioritized by the organization. Differences in recruitment, selection, training, 
promotion systems, etc. result in different contents (pp. 13–14). Currently the culture 
within the CA Regiment is fractured into three separate sub-cultures with different 
contents, driving different directions of behavior patterns.  
The divergent sub-cultures in the CA community can be explained by the lack of 
reinforcement of a shared organizational identity, or ideology, through identifications. 
Even though individuals can volunteer and request to join CA because they become 
attracted to the CA mission or a CA identity—a process called natural identification, they 
still have to go through the selected identification process during which they are 
recruited, screened and selected (Quinn et al., 1988, pp. 347–348). The RC/AC divide 
begins with the separate recruitment and selection processes between the two 
components. This type of divide runs deeper through the evoked identification process of 
indoctrination and socialization in different training pipelines (e.g., CAQC) where 
individuals normally would begin to adopt the identity of the organization (p. 348), 
except RC and AC personnel adopt separate respective RC and AC identities. The 
indoctrination and socialization continue as personnel arrive at their units—RC or AC—
after accession into the branch. As the reinforcement of the organizational identities 
occurs perhaps more strongly at the respective units, a divide between the 95th and the 
85th BDEs manifests post-CAQC for their personnel. Due to the different mission sets, 
more specialized training, and the different external stakeholders that the two BDEs 
support, an us vs. them mentality emerges. In such an environment of parochialism, 
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collaboration and coordination suffer, setting the condition for more negative anecdotal 
experiences that continue to deepen the divides in a re-enforcing loop, increasing the 
respective strengths of the three separate sub-cultures. 
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APPENDIX B. GLOBAL CA PRESENCE (BY COCOMS) 2006–2014 
A. AFRICOM 
 
Figure 33.  AFRICOM CA Presence (by Component) from 2006–2014 
CA deployments to AFRICOM support what the combatant commander, General 
Rodriguez (2014), refers to as one of the “smallest combatant commands.” Though it is 
small, AFRICOM has a robust set of mission requirements given the fact the geographic 
combatant command plays a key role in “strengthening relationships with current and 
potential regional powers” and is “key to shaping the future security environment to 
advance our enduring national interests of security, prosperity, values, and promoting 
international order” (p. 2). CA forces, as depicted on the map, are deployed to a 
significant amount of countries in Africa, particularly across the central portion of the 
continent known for instability and being an area in which Al Qaeda linked terrorist 
organizations are known to operate.  
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Since AFRICOM is considered a small combatant command and receives a 
proportional amount of resources, this force the commander has to prioritize what assets 
can best get the biggest payoff with the least amount of investment. CA assets are ideal 
for this situation due to the fact they represent a relatively minimal amount of 
investment—anywhere from four personnel (CA team) to 32 personnel (CA Company)—
with a high rate of return via capacity building activities, as well as reach back to 
interagency and international organizations. By training host nation personnel, and 
enabling them to achieve success in governance development, AFRICOM resources can 
be utilized elsewhere. 
Based on geospatial analysis, RC CA has deployed to the most countries. This is 
most likely because AFRICOM locations tend to be environments that are more 
permissive and require more assistance in governance and capacity development 
activities, which is what RC CA forces excel at doing through functional specialties. 
Additionally, these type of recurring deployments can be programmed well in advance, 
which provides reservists time to mobilize and train to support those mission sets. The 
second most deployed entity is the 95th CA BDE(A). This makes sense given the 




Figure 34.  CENTCOM CA Presence (by Component) from 2006–2014 
The CENTCOM Mission Statement reads “With national and international 
partners, CENTCOM promotes cooperation among nations, responds to crises, and deters 
or defeats state and non-state aggression, and supports development and, when necessary, 
reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability and 
prosperity” (Austin, 2014, p. 4). CA deployments between 2006 and 2014 are in line with 
the combatant commander’s intent, particularly with regard to cooperation with partner 
nations, and developing capacity through enabling development and reconstruction. This 
was clearly evident in Iraq and Afghanistan where all three CA organizations—
USACAPOC(A), 95th CA BDE(A) and 85th CA BDE—have deployed in support of OIF 
and OEF. This is of no surprise considering those two locations were where the bulk of 
U.S. forces (SOF and GPF) have deployed in support of the Global War on Terror. 
Through geospatial analysis, the authors were also able to identify Jordan as a 
country in which all three CA organizations have deployed. It is the authors’ assumption 
that this is due to the fact the U.S. is supporting capacity building activities, as well as 
establishing a forward presence in the event the humanitarian crises in Iraq and Syria 
bleed over in to Jordan, specifically with regard to refugees fleeing the fighting. 
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Additionally, the presence of all three CA entities in Jordan gives the CENTCOM 
commander operational flexibility, especially if U.S. actions against ISIS in Syrian and 
Iraq evolve to the point in which ground forces are introduced to support U.S. objectives. 
Last, through geospatial analysis the authors were able to determine that the 95th 
CA BDE(A) and USACAPOC(A) elements deployed to the most countries in the 
CENTCOM area of operations. This is due to not only the large SOF and GPF presence 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also due to the SOF only presence in Yemen, Pakistan, 
Qatar, and Tajikistan—95th CA BDE(A)—and the GPF specific presence in Kuwait and 
Kazakhstan. Also, both CA organizations—95th CA BDE(A) and USACAPOC(A)—
have been in existence longer than the 85th CA BDE, which is a key factor when 
discussing the amount of countries CA forces have a presence. 
C. EUCOM 
 
Figure 35.  EUCOM CA Presence (by Component) from 2006–2014 
In addition to the requirements set forth by the 2014 QDR, the EUCOM 
commander’s priorities are as follows: (1) Preserve our strategic partnerships; (2) Sustain 
relationship with our allies to ensure a strong NATO Alliance; (3) Preserve recently 
developed allied and partner capability and interoperability; and (4) Maintain regional 
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stability and security (Breedlove, 2014, pp. 2–16). As depicted on the ARCGIS map, CA 
deployments over the course of the eight years seem to fall in line with EUCOM 
commander’s priorities. Specifically, Reserve CA assets have been utilized to sustain 
relationships with U.S. allies, particularly NATO allies (i.e., UK, France, Poland, 
Hungary, Netherlands) and the 95th CA BDE(A) has been utilized to preserve strategic 
partnerships especially in the Balkans through CMSE. The 85th CA BDE has been used 
mostly to support interoperability exercises in countries, such as Poland, Macedonia, 
Bosnia, and Italy (Breedlove, 2014). Where all CA forces have had a presence is in 
Bosnia, which is not surprising considering the rise of violent extremism that has 
strategic implications given reports that several fighters from the region have traveled to 
the Iraq and Syria to fight on the side of ISIS (Khederian, 2014). 
The CA presence in several EUCOM countries, particularly enduring and new 
allies reinforces EUCOM commander General Breedlove’s belief that persistent presence 
and engagement with U.S. partners is critical in developing trust and credibility, which is 
crucial in order to have success in when operating as a coalition. He stated, “That trust 
comes from the relationships that can only be built and maintained through the actual, 
consistent and persistent presence of U.S. forces in Europe” (Breedlove, 2014, p. 7). This 
task is being handled by USACAPOC(A), which is of no surprise considering those type 
of deployments are the most predictable which suits the RC that has to plan further ahead 




Figure 36.  PACOM CA Presence (by Component) from 2006–2014 
The PACOM Posture Statement (Locklear, 2013) states, in 2011, the President 
directed his national security team to make America’s “presence and mission in the Asia-
Pacific a top priority” (pp. 2–5). This became known as the “Pivot to the Pacific” or the 
“rebalance to the Pacific.” Once given the task, U.S. Pacific Command developed a 
strategy via four lines operations that supported this strategic shift: (1) strengthening 
alliances and partnerships, (2) improving posture and presence, (3) developing 
capabilities and concepts, and (4) planning for operations and contingencies. The 
PACOM commander, Admiral Samuel Locklear (2013), stated in his posture statement 
that it is imperative that during the shift of focus, “we must clearly communicate to our 
allies and partners our commitment by maintaining a credible, forward deployed, 
sustainable force” (p. 7). That said, through spatial analysis it is clear that U.S. Army CA 
forces, regardless of component, are playing a key role in the shift, particularly with 
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regard to establishing a presence in several countries throughout the Pacific. This 
presence not only strengthens ties with partner nations, but also enables a force that 
specializes in capacity building and humanitarian relief to be forward deployed to region 
in which humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations have become commonplace 
during the past decade. 
Given those lines of operations, CA deployments between 2006 and 2014 in the 
PACOM AOR support, “Strengthening alliance and partnerships, Improving posture and 
Presence, and Planning for Operations” (pp. 1–2), which supports the strategic shift. This 
is evident, particularly with regard to the 85th CA BDE, which has had a presence in five 
of the United States’ seven treaty allied countries (Australia, Japan, Korea, Thailand, and 
the Philippines) and has had some type of presence in the most PACOM countries when 
compared to the 95th and USACAPOC, the 85th CA BDE is greater. These forces 
supported GPF in exercises, such as Talisman Sabre (Australia 2013), Yama 
Sakura/Orient Shield (Japan 2013 and 2014), Garuda Shield (Indonesia 2014) and Keris 
Strike (Malaysia 2014) in which the U.S. Army’s I Corps units were being evaluated. 
This was also an opportunity for U.S. forces to continue to strengthen relations with a key 
ally in the Pacific, as well as to build interoperability capacity with the Australians, 
Japanese, Indonesian and Malaysian forces. Additionally, all CA forces have had a 
presence in Indonesia, whether as part of an enduring CMSE embedded with the U.S. 
Country Team, or participation in an increasing amount of joint training and exercise. 
Such presence is in line with the PACOM commander’s desire to support the Indonesian 
government’s desire to quell violent extremism, characterized as “the cornerstone” of the 
U.S.’s counterterrorism strategy in Southeast Asia (Locklear, 2013, p. 2). 
What the authors found of particular interest in their analysis is that a former U.S. 
adversary, Vietnam, provided access to U.S. CA forces in 2012 during the Pacific 
Partnership Exercise. Through cooperative engagement, the U.S.-Vietnamese relationship 
has improved in recent history. Such relationship building can be assumed that Vietnam’s 
willingness to provide access to a U.S. CA team was done for two reasons. First reason, 
CA teams are often viewed as being non-lethal in nature, as opposed to traditional 
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military units, particularly combat arms units. Second reason, China’s effort to gain 
influence in the Pacific, particularly in the contested Spratly Islands (Locklear, 2013). 
E. SOUTHCOM 
 
Figure 37.  SOUTCOM CA Presence (by Component) from 2006–2014 
SOUTHCOM is openly referred to by its commander, as an economy of force 
combatant command meaning it has to achieve its objectives without the same level of 
resources that other, high priority COCOMs, such as CENTCOM and PACOM (Kelly, 
2013). In order to work towards achieving the three objectives outlined in the 2014 
QDR—including “Protect the Homeland” given the proximity of South America to the 
United States—is through building partner capacity. The rationale being that if U.S. 
partners are capable in achieving and maintaining security in the region through training 
and exercises, the U.S. benefits with relatively low investment of resources, as opposed 
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to deploying large combat formations. In his posture statement, SOUTHCOM 
commander General Kelly (2013) specifically mentioned how the 95th CA BDE(A) 
forces support this effort:  
In 2012, SOCSOUTH had eleven civil affairs teams helping nine partner 
nations reduce the vulnerability of key populations to influence by 
transnational organized crime or violent extremism. These civil affairs 
teams assisted with counter-recruitment programs and, in many cases, 
helped partner nations build their own civil affairs capacities. (p. 40) 
Regarding persistent engagement, 95th CA BDE(A) and USACAPOC(A) have fit 
this niche nicely by both maintaining enduring presence through recurring deployments 
and/or exercises in which they conduct low-cost humanitarian assistance programs and 
provide training to build military and governmental capacity (Kelly, 2013). 
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APPENDIX C. CA NETWORK 2006–2014 
A. CA COMMAND NETWORK 
This network highlights the formal hierarchal relationships that exist between two 
CA units that conduct CA operations worldwide. Figure 38 is a sociogram of the CA 
Command Network, and Table 30 is its metrics. 
 
Figure 38.  2014: CA Command Network 
Table 30.   CA Command Network Metrics 
 
 
Analysis of this sub-network indicates a disconnected network where 
organizations are isolated in the sociogram. Isolation is caused by the lack of a unified 
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command for CA. In addition, the metrics shows that the longest path to travel is 6 and 
the speed, in which, information travels is 3; therefore, information can be slow going 
through out this network. This slow dispensing of information and timely 
communications can be problematic for internal and external stakeholders. Centrality 
measures reveal USACAPOC (A) with highest betweenness centrality measure, 0.017. In 
the context of this sub-network, it makes sense since this RC unit has majority of the 
political connections, general officers, and has been around the longest. Hence, 
USACAPOC (A) is in the best position to champion its organizational message; 
unfortunately, the CA community is divided on what is and how should that strategic 
message be administered. 
B. CA TRAINING NETWORK 
This network highlights the formal training relationships that exist among the CA 
force. Figure 39 is a sociogram of the CA Training Network, and Table 31 is its metrics.  
 
Figure 39.  2014: CA Training Network 
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Table 31.   CA Training Network Metrics  
 
 
Analysis of the CA Training sub-network indicates, also, a disconnected network 
where organizations are isolated in the sociogram. Isolation is caused by the lack of a 
unity and same standards among its five various training courses, which all results in a 
trained CA soldier. Even though 1st SWTG(A) is responsible for the training, it is 
administered through three major organizations—1st SWTG(A), 1st Training BDE(A), 
and 80th TASS BDE. The metrics indicate that the longest path to travel is 3 and the 
speed, in which, information travels is 1.8; therefore, information can move faster, but it 
is in three different silos. The various training organizations are problematic and lacks a 
common bonding experience within the force, which is further exacerbated at the 
operational level, and strategic level with varying degrees interpretations of what civil 
affairs is and can do. Centrality measures reveal 3rd TASS BDE with highest eigenvector 
centrality measure, 0.982 and the overall highest score. Interestingly, another RC unit has 
a position to have the most influence; yet this organization is only responsible for 
executing training for one of the five current training courses. Therefore, the CA 
Community can bring its training under one command or invest in training that is more 
individual in order to bridge the organizational divide that currently exists between the 
forces. 
C. CA OPERATIONAL NETWORK 
This sub-network is where CA units were deployed to foreign countries 
conducting CA operations-missions, exercises, training foreign militaries, assisting with 
local governance activities, international distastes, etc. Figure 40 contains the sociograms 
of the CA Operational Network, and Table 32 is its metrics. 
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Figure 40.  2006–2014 CA Operational Network 
Table 32.   CA Operational Network (1 Mode) Metrics 
 
 
The CA Operational sub-network was depicted, regardless of operational 
affiliation—SOF, RC, and GPF—by CA units supporting the COCOMs. Through multi-
step analysis, this depiction aided with visualizing which units historically supported the 
assigned COCOM. The first step entailed coding a two-mode network with units and 
countries. It was assumed that CA units in the same country had some contact with each 
other, which was coded in the second step. This assumption allows for linking two CA 
units together that were in the same country in order to facilitate a one-mode network, 
which was important for combining all the networks together. As the analysis yielded, the 
350th CA BDE has been the most active unit outside of its assigned AOR. Centrality 
measures reveal 97th CA BN with highest degree centrality measure, 0.017. Interestingly, 
the 1st AC unit has the position to have the most influence, the 97th CA BN supports 
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PACOM and has assisted with operations in CENTCOM, and this makes sense with the 
pivot to the Pacific in support of National Security Strategy, 2010.  
D. CA PARTNERSHIP NETWORK 
This sub-network is where one organization is connected to another organization 
for collaborative activities. Table 33 is a complete list of the organizations within the 
network; Figure 41 is a sociogram of the CA Partnership Network, and Table 34 is its 
metrics. 
 







Table 33.   CA Partnership Network Units and Organizations 
 
Table 34.   2014 CA Partnership Network Metrics 
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Analysis of the CA Partnership sub-network indicates that there are potentially 
narrative wars within the CA community. Key players within the narrative and strategic 
messaging are the CMAG, a recent ARSOF 2022 initiative to improve CA’s strategic 
value; the FOCA, a group that supports the interests of the 95th CA BDE (A); the CAA, a 
group that supports the interests of USACAPOC(A); and the IMSG, a group that has the 
charge to develop, assess, and integrate civilian professionals in the CA Community. 
Table 35, degree centrality measure is below. 
Table 35.   2014 CA Partnership Network Degree Centrality Measure 
 
Despite the CMAG being recently established in 2012, its ability to develop an 
influential network is impressive. With a two-person element posted in the National 
Capital Region (NCR), the CMAG has to potential to champion the CA Regiment’s 
strategic message with external stakeholders.  
 152
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 153
APPENDIX D. POV STATEMENTS 
A. DISCUSSIONS WITH NON-CA PERSONNEL 
 
Figure 42.  Non-CA Personnel POV Statement 1of 2 
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Figure 43.  Non-CA Personnel POV Statement 2 of 2 
B. DISCUSSIONS WITH CA PERSONNEL 
 
Figure 44.  CA Personnel POV Statement 1of 3 
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Figure 45.  CA Personnel POV Statement 2 of 3 
 
Figure 46.  CA Personnel POV 3 of 3 
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APPENDIX E. REFINED PROTOTYPES  
 
Figure 47.  Refined CA Creed 
  
Figure 48.  Alternate Versions of the CA Symbols Reflecting the Regimental 




Figure 49.  Refined Prototype 2a: Strategic Messaging 
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